DELIVERING CLIMATE RESILIENCE PROGRAMMES IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED CONTEXTS

Experiences from 15 projects across 13 countries: learning from the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme

BRACED KNOWLEDGE MANAGER

Aimee Neaverson, Catherine Gould and Katie Peters

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Aimee Neaverson is an experienced project manager at Development Works (a Plan International UK company), focusing on complex consortium-based projects across Africa and Asia. She has worked on a number of large DFID-funded programmes, including as Director of Operations for the BRACED Knowledge Manager consortium. She has a wealth of experience in designing programming for diverse contexts and groups, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Her project portfolio spans a range of thematic areas including climate change and resilience, conflict and governance, youth economic empowerment and gender equality. She has experience working in the field and at headquarters level to support programme development and implementation.

Catherine Gould is a programme manager and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist with 13 years' practical experience working on development, resilience-building and emergency response projects and programmes. This includes being based in insecure contexts, such as Mali, Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Catherine was a key member of the BRACED Knowledge Manager M&E team for the first two and a half years of the programme. She subsequently re-joined BRACED to help capture the wealth of programmatic learning to inform future practice beyond the programme.

Katie Peters is a Senior Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and specialises in the coherence of resilience across the post-2015 frameworks, disaster risk reduction in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the securitisation of climate change, financing for emergency preparedness, and the humanitarian–development nexus. Katie was the Deputy Director for the BRACED programme and lead researcher for the portfolio of research on the intersection of climate change, conflict and resilience.

This report should be read in conjunction with the following publication:

Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M. and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI.

Contents

List of tables

List of figures

List of boxes

Abbreviations

BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters programme
BRICS	Building Resilience in Chad and Sudan (BRACED project)
CBO	Community-based organisation
DCF	Decentralising Climate Funds (BRACED project and case study for this review)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK Government)
IRISS	Improving Resilience in South Sudan (BRACED project and case study for this review)
KII	Key informant interview
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SUR1M	Scaling-up Resilience to Climate Extremes for 1 Million People (BRACED project and case study for this review)
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (US Government)
WYL	Wati Yelema Labenw (BRACED project)

BRACED projects

Each BRACED project used different intervention strategies and was implemented in different climatic and operating contexts. The table below provides a brief summary of the location and focus of each of the BRACED projects, and the name/abbreviation by which they are referred to throughout the report.
The projects highlighted in white are the focus of the case studies that have informed and accompany this report.

Title and Description	Country	Lead Implementing Partner
Anukulan: Driving small farmer investment in climate-smart technologies to support climate resilient livelihoods and public–private partnerships	Nepal	International Development Enterprises (iDE)
Building Resilience (BRES): Changing farming practices to prepare for heavy rain and high temperatures	Burkina Faso	Welthungerhilfe (WHH)
Building Resilience in Chad and Sudan (BRICS): Improving community resilience through climate-smart agriculture, health and early warning systems, as well as increasing access to basic services	Chad and Sudan	Concern Worldwide
Climate Information and Assets for Resilience in Ethiopia (CIARE): Improving access to reliable climate information and increasing local communities' capacity to respond to climate threats	Ethiopia	Christian Aid
Decentralising Climate Funds (DCF): Ensuring the readiness of Mali and Senegal's devolved governments to invest global and national climate funds into public goods to meet local priorities	Senegal and Mali	Near East Foundation (NEF)
Improving Resilience in South Sudan (IRISS): Supporting farmers and agro-pastoralists, especially women and girls, to have improved resilience to drought and floods	South Sudan	Concern Worldwide
Livestock Mobility: Securing trans-border corridors for use by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and providing key services to support livestock mobility	Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali and Niger	Acting for Life (AFL)
Live with Water: Capturing urban floodwaters for water stock and micro-gardening through a multidisciplinary, integrated and inclusive approach	Senegal	Consortium for Economic and Social Research (CRES)
Market Approaches to Resilience (MAR): Supporting socially and environmentally responsible investment through private sector partnerships to reduce the impacts of shocks on vulnerable farmers	Ethiopia	Farm Africa
Myanmar Alliance: Empowering communities to determine local priorities for DRR and climate change adaptation, prioritising women and children as key drivers of change	Myanmar	Plan International

Title and Description	Country	Lead Implementing Partner
PRESENCES: Improving natural resource management and governance, climate resilient livelihoods and access to climate information services	Niger	Care International
PROGRESS: Building resilient governance, markets and social systems to support vulnerable households and communities to deal with climate-related shocks	Kenya and Uganda	Mercy Corps
Scaling-up Resilience to Climate Extremes for 1 Million People (SUR1M): Introducing intelligent agriculture, saving circles and radio messaging for resilience in the Niger River basin	Niger and Mali	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Wati Yelema Labenw (WYL): Strengthening community initiatives for resilience to climate extremes, including natural resource management	Mali	Blumont
Zaman Lebidi: developing strategies for market diversification, such as home gardens, a range of irrigation systems and development of lowlands	Burkina Faso	Christian Aid

Executive summary

Calls for accelerated climate action throughout 2019, whether on the streets or in ministerial-level policy discussions, routinely include the demand to support those most vulnerable to climate change and variability. Capacities to cope with climate impacts are lowest in contexts affected by fragility and conflict. It seems logical therefore that climate funds should be directed to these contexts, but the challenges involved, particularly in channelling funds through government systems, have prevented investment at the scale required. The capacity to anticipate, absorb and adapt to climate change remains low in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and few financing mechanisms have been developed to respond to this challenge.

The *Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters* (BRACED) programme sought to address this.

Highly innovative when it began in 2014 because of its inclusion of multiple conflict and post-conflict contexts, BRACED represented the largest financial resilience investment of its time. While significant effort has been made in monitoring and evaluating progress at a project and programme level, learning has yet to be consolidated on how to plan, deliver and manage climate resilience programmes and projects in fragile and conflict-affected contexts from an operational perspective. This report addresses that gap.

This review explores how climate resilience programmes and projects can be designed, established and managed to be resilient themselves in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It combines evidence-based learning from over four years of implementation from 15 projects across 13 countries, as well as from the BRACED Fund Manager and Knowledge Manager. A subset of BRACED projects – in Mali, Myanmar, Niger, South Sudan – were explored in particular depth: see the accompanying Case Study Synopsis.

The review is structured around three themes:

1. **Anticipate operational risks** by understanding them, considering how to integrate context analysis and risk management into project design and implementation, improving understanding of local contexts and the nature of risks and regularly refreshing this analysis.

2. **Absorb impacts** by building resilience, conflict sensitivity and a 'Do No Harm' approach into the project cycle of climate resilience programmes, as well as integrating peace-building, development, humanitarian and climate change adaptation approaches into programmes.

3. **Adapt to challenges** by aligning risk tolerance and project flexibility between donors and implementing partners, based on trust and clear communication, and establishing adaptive approaches and flexible funding mechanisms that enable the rapid adjustment of activities during crises to protect resilience gains on the ground.

Learning from each theme is consolidated to explore what then is appropriate and feasible when delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The report concludes with a set of key considerations for both donors and implementing agencies.

The recommendations indicate that significant change is required to effectively deliver climate resilience programmes in difficult operating environments. How radical donors are willing to be will vary depending on their aid portfolio and priorities, the maturity of their systems and their risk tolerance. For some, making conflict analysis a prerequisite for climate programming will be a major change. For others, there may be appetite to bring together the climate, development, humanitarian and peace communities to better utilise their respective approaches to risk management and design programmes and funds that can address the double vulnerability of climate and conflict risk.

Unfortunately, the high level of vulnerability and exposure to climate change impacts for those living in contexts also affected by fragility and conflict are not likely to subside anytime soon. Warnings that conflict insensitive climate change programming may risk creating or escalating violent conflict poses further challenges, as does the reality that innovative financing mechanisms which could enable climate finance to be channelled to those genuinely most in need are hard to come by. Until the necessary governance mechanisms are in place to allow for equitable distribution of climate finance through formal channels, channelling resources through and to non-government actors will be necessary to ensure that those most immediately affected by climate impacts, who are also contending with issues of fragility and conflict, are not left behind in the fight against climate change.

The prevalence of long-term crises means that fragility and conflict must be seen as part of the overall context for many of the locations where climate action is needed. It is hoped that the lessons from BRACED will prove useful in the future design and implementation of climate resilience programmes and projects, for the benefit of the many people affected by climate change and living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

1. INTRODUCTION

Image: U.S. Campaign for Burma

Development actors wishing to support nations and their populations to become more resilient to climate change have long overlooked the challenges of working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. But climate extremes are not "conflict neutral", and such conditions have significant impacts on those who lack the resources and capacity to prepare for, respond to, and recover from climate-related shocks (Peters and Peters, 2018: 2). In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, conflict risks and climate-related risks combine to put further pressure on already poor communities, sometimes with devastating effects (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019).

The incidence of fragility is increasing, posing a major threat to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) States of Fragility report, "without action, more than 80% of the world's poorest will be living in fragile contexts by 2030", so development actors from all sectors must better understand the unique challenges of delivering development programmes in such areas (OECD, 2018: 7). Fragile and conflict-affected contexts have been attracting higher shares of development agency funding, increasing from $52 billion in 2007 to $68 billion in 2016, but these funds are not specifically dedicated to reducing climate risk (UNCTAD, 2017: 4).

Some in the climate resilience community are already working in geographical areas affected by humanitarian crises, but they are relatively new to programming in unstable and insecure contexts (Peters and Pichon, 2017). Also, levels of climate-specific investment remain low relative to need, with little literature on resilience in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, or how to effectively implement climate resilience projects in such settings (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016). However, much could be learned from the more established knowledge base of development sectors more accustomed to working in these contexts.

> Climate resilience efforts combine early action to prevent and mitigate crises with longer-term interventions to protect or re-establish people's livelihoods, that focus on building systemic and community capacities to withstand future shocks.

In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, there is a need to balance addressing immediate humanitarian needs with reducing vulnerability in the longer term. Some climate resilience programmes do work across the development–humanitarian spectrum, so there are opportunities to learn from their practical experience of delivering these projects and programmes in such settings.

The *Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters* (BRACED) programme was one of the first to deliver adaptation spending at scale, in post-conflict and conflict contexts. This £140 million Department for International Development (DFID)-funded programme supported 15 projects across 13 countries in Africa and Asia from 2014 to 2019. This resulted in the documentation of practical experiences in the funding, management and implementation of climate resilience programmes in a variety of fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The BRACED programme was designed to contribute to UK Government commitments to addressing climate change, and though it was not explicitly conflict- or security-focused, operating contexts were characterised by climate-related and humanitarian emergencies, political instability and violent conflict (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 6).

BRACED focused on learning from the technical aspects of building resilience to climate-related shocks and stresses, but with little attention to understanding the practical impacts of unstable contexts on operational delivery. The programme's donor DFID prioritised these impacts as a key area for learning and commissioned this review, which explores how climate resilience programmes and projects can be designed, established and managed to be resilient themselves in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It combines evidence-based learning from the BRACED programme with learning from both within and outside the sector, focusing on operational considerations rather

than more technical, programmatic considerations (see Figure 1). This significantly alters the lens through which evidence and learning is collated and presented, and may sit uncomfortably with some readers – as the emphasis is on operational concerns rather than recipient experiences or priorities. This focus is necessary as donors continue to channel substantial proportions of climate funds through local to international NGOs working in consortium, thus important lessons need to be learnt to inform future operations.

The review aims to assist both donors and implementing agencies by providing practical recommendations for operating in these settings. This practical learning will also be helpful to the growing community of practice that is exploring climate-conflict–resilience links, including donors wanting to invest climate funds in contexts affected by violence, fragility and violent conflict, and actors seeking to design and implement related programmes.

Figure 1. How operational delivery (as defined in this review) interacts with technical programming



The BRACED programme found that, to be resilient operationally, climate resilience programmes and projects need to: (1) foresee and plan for operational risks, (2) continue operations within adverse conditions where it is safe to do so, and (3) adapt to changing conditions in ways that are both opportunistic and strategic.

These characteristics relate closely to the BRACED interpretation of climate resilience as a set of interlinked capacities for dealing with climate-related shocks and stresses. In BRACED, these interlinked capacities were identified as being anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive, also known as the 3As (Bahadur, Peters, Wilkinson, Pichon, Gray and Tanner, 2015). This review takes the 3As and relates them to operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts:

1. **Anticipating operational risks** explores how risks can be understood and anticipated through effective context analysis and risk management by both implementing agencies and donors.

2. **Absorbing impacts** considers how the effects of operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts can be absorbed through conflict sensitivity, coordination and coherence with other actors, and integrated programming for better delivery.

3. **Adapting to challenges** looks at the importance of flexible and adaptive programming to support working within contexts of uncertainty, and the ability to respond effectively to changes in the operating environment.

The section on the implications for climate resilience programming consolidates the learning from these three themes and reflects on what is appropriate and feasible for climate resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The report closes with a set of reflections for future climate resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

This review is the result of six months of highly collaborative research. The review team interviewed more than 30 individuals involved in the funding, management and implementation of the BRACED programme, as well as external stakeholders working on other climate resilience programmes in similar contexts, and carried out an extensive review of over 240 BRACED documents and other literature. Although the review looks across the BRACED programme portfolio, there is a more in-depth focus on four BRACED projects: the BRACED *Decentralising Climate Funds* (DCF) project in Mali; the BRACED *Scaling up Resilience for One Million* (SUR1M) project in Mali and Niger; the BRACED *Improving Resilience in South Sudan* (IRISS) project in South Sudan; and the BRACED *Myanmar Alliance* project in Myanmar. These projects are referred to in this report; more detail can be found in the accompanying Case Study Synopsis (Neaverson, Gould, Tye, Teakle, Andrews, Singh, Singh, Na Abou and Peters, 2019).

Box 1. Definitions

Climate resilience is the long-term capacity of a system or process to [a] deal with extreme weather events and changes in climate and [b] continue to develop (Silva Villanueva, Sword-Daniels, Leavy, and Wilson, 2018: 2). In the BRACED programme, resilience is understood as the ability to anticipate, avoid, plan for, cope with, recover from, and adapt to climate-related shocks and stresses.[1]

Resilience-building interventions encompass a wide range of activities in both humanitarian and development settings and in all sectors to enhance people's livelihoods. Resilience programming can occur at global/regional, national, municipal/local and household levels and requires a systems approach that recognises the links between the sources of risks, vulnerability and poverty (Le Masson, 2018: 2).

Fragility is the opposite of resilience, considered as the combination of exposure to risk and an insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility may also lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies (OECD, 2018). The OECD notes the need to promote a shift from a one-dimensional understanding of fragility towards a more holistic approach which understands degrees of fragility as a spectrum of dimensions and risks (OECD, 2018).

Risk is often represented as the probability of the occurrence of hazardous events or trends, multiplied by the impacts if these events or trends do occur, resulting from the interaction of vulnerability, exposure, and hazard (Opitz-Stapleton, Nadin, Kellett, Calderone, Quevedo, Peters and Mayhew, 2019: 11).

Violent conflict is defined in this review according to the following joint United Nations (UN) and World Bank definition. 'Conflicts are inherent in all societies and are managed, mitigated, and resolved in nonviolent manners through, for example, political processes … formal and informal judicial systems, local dispute mechanisms, or dialogue. But sometimes conflict may turn violent, causing enormous human and economic loss. Violent conflict can take various forms, including interstate war, armed conflict, civil war, political and electoral violence, and communal violence, and can include many actors, including states and nonstate actors, such as militias, insurgents, terrorist groups, and violent extremists' (Peters and Peters, 2018: 3).



2. ANTICIPATING OPERATIONAL RISKS

Image:
Staffan Scherz

The first theme of this review considers how to anticipate operational risks in fragile and conflict-affected contexts through effective context analysis and risk management throughout the programme cycle. This goes further than just stating that "context matters" and involves thinking through what the context means for operational delivery and how best to tailor programming accordingly. The characteristics of fragile and conflict-affected contexts are multifaceted, and there are multiple challenges associated with working in this type of operating environment. There were numerous examples of BRACED project activities being adversely affected by violent conflict and insecurity, which shows the importance of better understanding conflict risk within climate resilience programmes. Complex and fluid operating environments require thorough and regularly updated analyses to improve understanding of the drivers and dynamics of conflict. If such risks are better understood – which involves risk identification, assessment, mitigation, management and monitoring – they can be better integrated into delivery.

The key questions are twofold:

1. What types of delivery challenges are faced when implementing climate resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts?
2. How can context analysis and risk management approaches be better integrated into design and implementation?

Understanding the operating environment: key challenges in operational delivery

Operational delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is not "business as usual"; complex challenges require very different approaches from those in programmes operating in more stable operating environments (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015). Operational challenges for climate resilience programmes in such contexts are similar to those affecting other types of programmes. This is not surprising given that climate resilience programmes are effectively "good development with 'tweaks'" that support communities to deal with shocks and stresses (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 14).

What makes these programmes different is their wide-ranging, multidisciplinary interventions – from delivery of basic services to natural resource management to climate and weather information (to name but a few) – combined with components that are more humanitarian in nature – all with the aim of building anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacities for dealing with climate-related shocks and stresses (Bahadur, Peters, Wilkinson, Pichon, Gray and Tanner, 2015). Furthermore, the very nature of the vulnerabilities they seek to address means that climate resilience programmes are often implemented in areas affected by chronic humanitarian crises, such as food insecurity resulting from recurrent climate-related events such as drought. Given these characteristics, operational delivery of climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is affected by common challenges in four distinctive ways.

Experience from the BRACED programme shows that climate resilience programmes are complex interventions that involve layering and linking a set of processes and activities to reach the most vulnerable and marginalised to address inequalities. They also need to respond and adapt to changing contexts, as well as scaling and embedding efforts into ongoing government processes. This has implications for what to do and when and how to do it, to build climate resilience from both a technical and operational perspective.

Challenge 1. Difficulties in predicting and being open about what is appropriate and feasible

The aim of building resilience is "particularly appropriate" to areas affected by conflict, fragility and protracted or recurrent crises, but there are major challenges associated with operating in these contexts that can impact on project operations in various and unpredictable ways (Levine and Mosel, 2014). With implementing agencies competing for funding, there is a tendency to list such issues in the "assumptions" column in project logframes and hope for best-case scenarios. This then leads to only headline and superficial mitigation strategies, with inadequately resourced action plans.

Common in BRACED projects was the apparent disparity between the expectations of project plans and the reality of how unpredictable contexts might evolve and what would actually be possible. Implementing partners did demonstrate contextual awareness in project proposals, but they sometimes underestimated exactly how much operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts would affect delivery on the ground, especially concerning the scale of the negative impacts.

For example, the funding proposal for the BRACED IRISS project, led by Concern Worldwide and implemented by a consortium of international and local partners in South Sudan, included headline details of the insecurity and conflict context and the weak market and governance situation. At the time of the proposal, one million people remained displaced due to conflict and the proposal acknowledged that conflict and displacement might continue throughout the project's lifetime. However, the project targeted relatively stable areas, meaning that the broader conflict context was not expected to significantly interrupt operational delivery; indeed, one of the main project assumptions was that conflict would not "significantly hamper" interventions.[2] This was also the view of the donor (DFID) and the Fund Manager at the beginning of the programme, when the project showed a lot of promise. That said, the IRISS team expected they would need to take a flexible and iterative approach, given that the political and social dynamics in South Sudan were "extremely fluid".[3]

In reality, however, the BRACED project in South Sudan operated in the backdrop of a protracted and growing crisis throughout.[4] Though operating areas remained relatively stable, they were still affected by a deteriorating situation elsewhere in the country (further explored in the Implications for Climate Resilience Programming section). When asked how the reality differed from the original expectations, a project team member from Concern Worldwide reflected, "maybe we didn't expect it to be as hard". Despite the main implementing partners having had previous programming experience in the operating areas, they did not foresee the scale of uncertainty regarding a peace agreement and the related political turmoil that was to continue throughout the project's implementation.[5]

BRACED worked where climate-related risks interacted with pre-existing social, economic and political stresses, including poor governance, chronic food insecurity and instability (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 86). All the contexts where BRACED projects operated could be considered fragile and/or conflict-affected, but the nature of this varied greatly in scope, scale, severity and timing both across and within projects (see Box 2). In its early programme-level reporting, the BRACED Fund Manager considered that while unsurprising in the difficult context within which BRACED projects operated, the conflict- and climate-related shocks experienced were "beyond what could reasonably be factored into project design".[6]

Box 2. Examples of operation contexts in the BRACED programme

- In **Mali**, BRACED projects operated in a context of political instability and tension, with rising insecurity and frequent episodes of violent conflict between armed rebel groups and government forces. Ongoing intercommunal conflict added to this dynamic, with violent clashes between farmers and pastoralists. Recurrent food insecurity meant that 2.5 million people were considered food insecure at the end of 2018.[7]

- In **Niger**, the security situation in BRACED operating areas was volatile despite a relatively stable domestic political climate, with increased jihadist attacks and drug trafficking leading to an extended state of emergency in certain areas and high levels of internal displacement. On top of the political instability, the government implemented a $40 million emergency plan and requested assistance to cope with immediate humanitarian needs related to climate extremes.[8]

- In **South Sudan**, the operating environment was characterised by violent conflict at all levels, including local resource-based and ethnic-based tensions alongside an ongoing national-level peace process and multiple ceasefires. During the project's lifetime, there was a change in the national governance structure, but institutional and policy structures continued to be weak. The economic situation worsened with hyperinflation and an unstable exchange rate, and an extreme level of food insecurity.[9]

- In **Myanmar**, there have been decades of armed conflict. Despite a ceasefire agreed in 2015, the situation remains volatile, with sporadic clashes between armed ethnic groups and the government. Shortly after the BRACED project's inception, a new government was elected, followed by a transition from a closed economy under military rule to a democracy and market economy. However, there has since been a deterioration in the country's political situation and increased conflict in some areas.[10]

Challenge 2: Climate–conflict linkages exacerbating risks in delivery

The linkages between violent conflict and climate change are complex and have been the subject of significant recent debate (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 5). Generally, there is consensus that evidence of climate change as a cause of violence is limited and inconclusive, but the indirect links are less contested (Mobjörk, Gustafsson, Sonnsjö, Van Baalen, Dellmuth and Bremberg, 2016). There is growing agreement that climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, with evidence that compounding conflict and climate risk is already a reality (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 7). There may also be "negative feedback loops", whereby violent conflict and fragility amplify the impacts of climate-related shocks and stresses due to an increased vulnerability and reduced capacity of both communities and the state to effectively deal with climate change (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 5).

The operational challenges faced by BRACED projects stemmed from the so-called "double vulnerability" of working in countries susceptible to both climate-related disasters and political instability and violent conflict (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019). This was not wholly unexpected. The original BRACED business case explored risks related to insecurity and violent conflict and considered them as "high impact", even positing that one or more projects might not be able to operate due to a deteriorating security situation. The probability of this occurring in the Sahel was considered 'medium'; it was considered 'low' probability in the non-Sahel countries. The potential that climate-related and conflict-related shocks could overwhelm coping capacities in the Sahel was also considered. Despite these risks, the perceived cost of not intervening to build climate resilience was that there would be an increase in humanitarian disasters and an increased instability in the region. This was in the context of existing conflict and challenges related to weak governance in some Sahelian countries. In other words, the investment was justified from a prevention perspective. The donor, DFID, felt that the programme could reduce the impacts of climate-related disasters that can be a contributing factor to instability and conflict, and that building resilience was therefore vital to breaking the recurrent cycle of humanitarian crises.[11]

The space for resilience-building activities in times of crisis is, however, often reduced. Due to the changing needs and priorities of project stakeholders, humanitarian activities take precedence over development activities. The non-BRACED project, Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts (LPRR), for example, led by Christian Aid, suspended its natural resource management activities in Kenya during the 2016 drought (KII 30). Within BRACED, 'threat multiplication' was seen in both East and West Africa where BRACED was operating. Changing rainfall patterns, increasing drought and resource scarcity coupled with impacts such as migration, food insecurity and market disruption, have seemingly contributed to violent conflict involving pastoralists and farmers (Mobjörk, Gustafsson, Sonnsjö, Van Baalen, Dellmuth and Bremberg, 2016: 8). In 2016, such conflict led to the BRACED *Livestock*

Mobility project suspending routine resilience building activities in one operating area in Burkina Faso, switching instead to providing humanitarian assistance to refugees (see Box 3).

Box 3. Switching from resilience building to humanitarian activities

Fleeing violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, two thousand refugees arrived in Noumbiel, Burkina Faso in 2017, one of the operating areas of the BRACED *Livestock Mobility* project. The project, which sought to reduce violent conflict between pastoralists and farmers through its routine programme activities of securing pastoralist 'corridors' in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, responded to the new humanitarian need. The local implementing partner did not continue routine project activities alongside the humanitarian response, as local government and communities were preoccupied with the refugee crisis, so carrying on with planned BRACED activities was considered inappropriate in the circumstances. The implementing agency also did not have the capacity to deliver routine resilience and humanitarian activities in parallel. The humanitarian response was only made possible by BRACED contingency funding available to projects operating in the Sahel through *Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Sahelian Emergencie* (PHASE) (see also Theme 3 on Adapting to Challenges) (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 29–42).

Challenge 3: Contextual factors disrupt programming

A common challenge of programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – and an absolute priority for all agencies – is ensuring the safety and duty of care of staff and project partners. During periods of heightened tension and outbreaks of violent conflict, BRACED staff and partner travel to affected areas was reduced or suspended until it was deemed safe to resume normal activities. This affected both the delivery, and monitoring and evaluation, of BRACED projects in Mali, Niger, South Sudan and Myanmar, as seen in the case studies for this review. Disruption to ongoing project presence in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is a particular issue for climate resilience programmes. This is because, from a technical perspective, effective building of climate resilience requires sustained engagement between project staff and communities (Leavy, Boydell, McDowell and Sladkova, 2018: 89).

The approaches used by each BRACED project in responding to changes in fragility and conflict were guided by the security policies of agencies involved in operational delivery, as well as government policies. In both the BRACED DCF and BRACED *Wati Yelema Labenw* (WYL) projects in Mali, persistent insecurity meant that international staff were unable to carry out field visits at various times during the projects' lifetime. For example, travel to the Mopti region was

particularly restricted because of the risk of attack, with the UK Government advising against all travel to the Mopti region, while the US Government advised against travel to the whole of Mali in 2018. In addition to internationally imposed travel restrictions, project staff also had to contend with the Malian Government banning the use of motorbikes, which affected their freedom of movement and access to project sites. Community members and government officials were also restricted in their ability to travel due to threat of attack. Together, these factors had a direct impact on project planning, implementation and management, and meant that some areas had less exposure to the projects than originally intended.[12]

In some cases, insecurity led to BRACED operating areas being redefined to ensure the safety of project partners and staff. The BRACED WYL project in Mali stopped working in Tombouctou, one of its four operating areas, due to very high security risks (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 87). Part of the BRACED IRISS project was due to be implemented in the Upper Nile State of South Sudan, but this region was de-selected during the project development grant phase for security and conflict reasons before proposal submission.[13] In other cases, project activities were continued via 'remote management' or the DFID requirement for UKAid branding was waived, for example for the BRACED *Building Resilience in Chad and Sudan* (BRICS) project in Chad and Sudan and for the BRACED *Scaling Up Resilience for 1 Million (SUR1M)* project in Mali and Niger, where doing otherwise could have increased security risks.[14]

One of the most common impacts of conflict was delayed programming, as seen across the BRACED projects affected by insecurity.[15] Often only one or a subset of operating areas was affected at any one time, and programming was therefore able to continue as planned in non-affected areas. Moreover, the fact that risk was spread across many different activities helped the situation;[16] for example non-field-based research could often continue when field-based activities could not. Nevertheless, delays were a frequent issue, particularly delays related to procurement, since "doing procurement is harder in fragile contexts".[17]

BRACED projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts monitored the context as it developed, providing updates to the Fund Manager at least once a month on how the context was evolving, if and how it was affecting delivery, and the proposed response to keep delivery of results on track.[18] BRACED monthly reports had a section on key risks/challenges and related mitigation actions, and this reporting became more refined as the projects progressed, based on project team experience and feedback from the Fund Manager.

Programming delays at the project level were partly due to context, but largely resulted from unrealistic expectations regarding how quickly the projects would see actual climate resilience impacts. This, in turn, led to delays at the overall programme level. For example, 15 months into the programme, the BRACED programme was delayed in terms of its spending by 12 months based on initial project forecasts.[19] One of the main forms of risk mitigation was the diversity of the project portfolio,[20] the theory being that by operating in a range of different contexts, the programme would continue operations in at least some of these, thereby reducing the risk of overall delivery failure.[21] Despite this,

project-level implementation delays led to the programme requesting a one-year extension, translating into a 3–6-month extension for completion of activities at project level.

Challenge 4: Programming requires higher levels of resourcing and scrutiny

Donors including DFID have acknowledged that working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is "costly" (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 3), and experience from the BRACED programme showed that the true cost of doing business in such areas was often masked. Additional costs associated with dealing with insecurity, unpredictable economic and political conditions, weak institutional capacity and poor infrastructure were in fact, often effectively subsidised by implementing agencies.[22] In the BRACED SUR1M project in Mali, there was a security incident where a staff member of an implementing agency was killed in 2018. In response, the lead implementing agency's national team assessed their security protocols and developed an action plan to strengthen security measures at the country-level across multiple projects.[23] This was covered by organisational overheads rather than the project budget. Dealing with security risks with enhanced support from central implementing agency teams is not uncommon. However, given the significant additional inputs needed, it is often not replicable or sustainable without additional funding.[24]

Experience from the BRACED programme also shows that management of projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts requires a different approach, which is often more resource-intensive than for those operating in more stable settings. The BRACED Fund Manager was more involved with projects where there were delivery issues and plans were off schedule. According to one member of the team, "by definition, the Fund Manager did treat projects that were operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts differently because they faced delivery challenges more often" (KII 10). Time invested was higher than anticipated, as additional time was required for example for closer monitoring of procedures and for processing budget and project design changes (KII 10). The Fund Manager was also more closely involved due to the increased fiduciary risk when working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, linked to higher levels of potential reputational risk for DFID.[25] Finally, donors are likely to make more requests for information from projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In the BRACED programme, this included asking projects in South Sudan and Myanmar for more information on how they were engaging with governments, including financial transactions (KII 10).

Integrating context analysis and risk management approaches for more effective delivery

Approaches to risk management may evolve during a programme or a project's lifetime, based on how the perceived level of risk changes. BRACED was an inherently risky programme, as it was seeking to do something relatively new and difficult in its aim to build climate resilience in a number of fragile and conflict-affected contexts.[26] Box 4 provides an account of how risk was perceived and mitigated in BRACED.

Box 4. How risk was perceived and mitigated in the BRACED programme

Risk related to operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts was mitigated in BRACED by: (i) working with a diverse set of local partners including those with expertise and experience operating in these contexts, (ii) monitoring the security situation and maintaining an ongoing dialogue with implementing partners to consider how operations could be maintained, and in the Sahel only, by (iii) making humanitarian contingency funding available, and (iv) working on conflict prevention strategies.[27] This review found evidence of the first three of these four strategies being used, but overall risk ratings remained at relatively high levels throughout the programme, as seen in annual reviews. DFID introduced a new risk framework part way through the programme which accounts for the different terminology across years for similar levels of risk, with a 'traffic light' system applied to make the ratings comparable:

2014 – Medium (pre-programme)	**2015 – High** Post-inception	**2016 – Major** 15 months into implementation	**2017 – Moderate** 2+ years into implementation	**2018 – Moderate** At the start of 1-year extension

Risks related to operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts were ever-present and made up an increasing share of the overall risk. The rating in 2016 was deemed 'major' due to the extent to which these risks had materialised, alongside there being only 18 months left of the original three-year programme at the time.[28] Further strategies emerged based on experiences from implementing and managing BRACED projects.

- There was an increased focus on adaptive management.
- A flexible funding mechanism was used successfully for a period to mitigate the risk of slow or disrupted implementation by funding the scale-up of high-performing parts of the portfolio using underspend

from elsewhere in BRACED. But DFID and the Fund Manager decided to suspend its use fearing that it would unfairly reward 'early movers' rather than being about the most potential for resilience results in the longer term.

- A one-year extension provided more time for project delivery and achieving results, with closer monitoring of projects deemed at risk of failing including action plans and regular updates to the donor, DFID.[29]

Risks related to insecurity and conflict were documented in project-level and programme-level risk registers. Projects were responsible for developing their own mitigating strategies, and the Fund Manager would 'push them' for more detail on some areas in order to capture the risks, mitigation measures and actions expected (KII 10).

Experience from BRACED shows that it is important to actively manage and respond to risks for more effective management of climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The BRACED programme saw an increased focus on risk throughout its lifetime, particularly for those related to operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and those related to drought.[30] By the third year of BRACED, risk was central to decision-making processes, with systems in place to ensure risks were identified, assessed, monitored, and where possible, reduced to manageable levels.[31] Risk management became a standing agenda point in monthly management meetings between DFID, the BRACED Fund Manager and the Knowledge Manager, with the highest risks reviewed at least quarterly (KIIs 10 and 25).

Risk management was increasingly delegated to the Fund Manager, even if not explicitly, over time. For the donor, the Fund Manager had a key role in monitoring day-to-day management and was expected to make judgement calls as to whether the scale of emerging risks warranted the donor being alerted (KIIs 10 and 25). Based on a review of BRACED annual reports, the Fund Manager's analysis of risk became more refined and nuanced over time, as individual projects and the overall programme became established and as internal and external contexts became better known and understood. The interpretation of risk expanded from a focus on the delivery of results at the start, to a more detailed consideration of contextual, delivery, operational, fiduciary, reputational and safeguarding risks.[32]

The Fund Manager also became more reflective after the first year of implementation, admitting to having been "over-optimistic in their assessment of the project's abilities to deliver to an ambitious timescale" (KII 10). They also reported "more recent realism in judgement" given the high-risk contexts in which BRACED operated.[33] There was indeed a high level of risk, with some significant operational delays and underspends across the portfolio that led the Fund Manager to ask certain projects to restructure, such as the BRACED IRISS

project in South Sudan, though this was considered by implementing partners as a more contentious aspect of the Fund Manager's risk management strategy.

The BRACED Fund Manager's approach was not always popular with implementing teams on the ground. As well as project restructuring, one of the key mitigation measures for the risks of (1) project failure due to persistent poor performance or external shocks, and (2) political, conflict, security and climate-related shocks (beyond that reasonable to anticipate/ plan for) was closer monitoring of the projects "deemed at risk or failing".[34] The additional reporting demands and intensive level of scrutiny were considered a burden by project members, who were already under considerable pressure from living and working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (KIIs 6 and 10).

Over the course of the BRACED programme, the Fund Manager's approach to risk (on behalf of the donor) appeared to move from being risk-averse to being risk-informed. According to a member of the Fund Manager, they moved away from a blanket approach, to managing risks on a case-by-case basis (KII 10). This aligned with DFID's three-point risk-aware approach to implementation: (1) understanding and being explicit and honest about the uncertainties and challenges faced on a daily basis, (2) accepting an "appropriate level of risk" to achieve development objectives; and (3) clearly articulating "risk appetite" and actively managing risk accordingly (DFID, 2019).

Based on the BRACED experience, strong relationships, open communications, mutual understanding and high levels of trust between implementing partners, the donor and the Fund Manager are key to effective risk and programme management, and there should be recognition that these take time to develop (KIIs 6, 10 and 25).

Sound risk management depends on good contextual analysis. However, there is some evidence to suggest that robust conflict and political economy analysis have been absent from the design of climate resilience programmes (and their disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and mitigation predecessors). This runs the risk of inappropriate interventions that do more harm than good (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 6). As such, the importance of properly understanding the "day-to-day reality" of the context cannot be overstated (Teskey, 2017: 2).

The BRACED IRISS project in South Sudan undertook a conflict analysis at the proposal stage and included a research component to understand the links between conflict and climate resilience, and the impacts of the context on its own programming. The project team took a reflective approach to their work throughout and demonstrated a strong understanding of their operating context.[35] According to a researcher at Tufts University, who undertook research for this project in Sudan and Chad, "it's impossible to build climate resilience without understanding and taking into account conflict dynamics".[36] Taking a conflict-sensitive approach to delivery is further explored in Theme 2 (Absorbing Impacts).

As also noted by the OECD, operating in "complex and fluid" settings requires a thorough context analysis to understand the drivers and dynamics of fragility (OECD, 2016). The theory is that, through a better understanding of the risks involved in operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, they can be factored into programming. One good practice approach to learn from – identified in a recent ICAI report – involves the development of a comprehensive risk matrix articulating a broad basket of risks. In the case of a non-BRACED resilience programme in Nepal, these were in relation to conflict, natural-hazard-related disasters, political commitment, government restructuring, partnership, procurement and internal staff capacity. The programme then developed mitigation measures for each risk (ICAI, 2018).

3. ABSORBING IMPACTS

Image: willemstom

The second theme of this review is about absorbing impacts related to fragile and conflict-affected contexts through conflict sensitivity, coordination and coherence with other actors, and integrated programming for better delivery. The BRACED experience highlights the importance of climate resilience programmes being plugged into the existing humanitarian and peace-building infrastructure for both monitoring and managing risk and to ensure that they meet the principles of Do No Harm.

The key question is how to move towards a more integrated approach between sectors to enable better delivery. This requires coordination mechanisms that facilitate cross-sector responses, though integrated programming that goes beyond just working across sectors. There is much debate about whether climate, humanitarian and peace-building goals can or should be combined, but there is a growing international interest in joined-up programming. BRACED tested some more integrated ways of working, and there is anecdotal evidence that, in some cases, projects have contributed to creating a more enabling environment for peace-building.

Conflict sensitivity

Conflict-sensitive programming is an approach to identifying and addressing operational risks, with safeguards built in to avoid doing harm while aiming to reduce contextual risks. Conflict sensitivity involves careful analysis of the potential positive or negative impacts projects may have on existing tensions, and then designing and monitoring approaches that minimise any unintended negative consequences (a Do No Harm approach) while maximising positive impacts. As this research is focused on operational delivery, not technical programming (see Figure 1), we first reflect on conflict sensitivity with a view to how a conflict-sensitive approach might help help donors and implementing partners mitigate operational risks, including those related to reputation, fiduciary and security issues. For example, field staff are less likely to be targeted for attack or find their work disrupted if projects are conflict sensitive and are accepted by local communities.

Pre-dating BRACED, the **'Basic Operating Guidelines in Nepal'** are an example of a successful conflict-sensitive approach, introduced in 2003 when violent conflict was limiting operational space for implementing agencies (OECD, 2016: 47). It sought to:

- Apply strict security principles and Do No Harm criteria.
- Maintain added-value interventions and best practices.
- Demonstrate tangible results that justify the presence of development agencies.
- Adjust methods of working to minimise exposure and risk, e.g. preventing unnecessary mobility.
- Maintain impartial communication contacts and work through local communities and local NGOs.
- Ensure that the positive effects of agencies' presence are highly visible.
- Ensure that agencies are accountable to all stakeholders.

Conflict sensitivity is not a new approach for those working in conflict and humanitarian sectors, but this review shows the importance of ensuring that climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts adopt conflict-sensitive approaches, even when not explicitly working on conflict-related interventions. All interventions have intentional or unintentional socioeconomic, political and environmental impacts, further increased in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, with positive impacts including the reduction of tensions and improving relationships between groups (Christian Aid, 2018: 4).

While climate resilience programmes and those focused on broader development themes are increasingly working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the operational realities of violent conflict and insecurity are not often taken into account in an adequate manner.[37] From a programming perspective, a key distinction between conflict-affected and non-conflict-affected contexts is that

the consequences of doing any less than an excellent job in any of these elements are much more serious in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, when a poorly designed or delivered programme can expose beneficiaries and programme staff to "unacceptable levels of risk".[38] For resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, conflict sensitivity is crucial, with a minimum objective being that interventions tackling climate change risks should not increase conflict risks. Adopting a conflict-sensitive approach not only makes climate resilience programmes more effective, but it also makes programme implementation safer for staff and beneficiaries (Christian Aid, 2018: 4). Operationally, conflict sensitivity is important for staff security and for mitigating reputational risk, both for donors and implementing partners.

According to a representative of the BRACED IRISS project in South Sudan, "The project was always looking at the unintended consequences of what we were doing and having people discuss more around any implications … This has to be incorporated into programming along with consideration of Do No Harm and protection issues. This might be seen as a detriment or obstacle to programming but in actual fact it was a very good buffer to ensure we weren't doing harm on the ground".[39]

A 'spectrum of ambition' exists in conflict-sensitive approaches (Haider, 2014).

- Working around: seeking to avoid negative impacts of conflict on programmes by avoiding conflict areas and avoiding one-size-fits-all interventions that ignore the conflict context.
- Working in: being aware that interventions can impact conflict dynamics and minimising the potential for exacerbating violence.
- Working on: being aware that interventions can contribute to peace-building, and aiming to deliver programmes that include conflict prevention, management or resolution.

The first step for achieving conflict sensitivity is to understand the possible intended and unintended consequences of interventions through conflict analysis. It is also important to understand the trade-offs; as a BRACED researcher noted, "the assumption is that projects are socially neutral, but they are not… and we must be explicit about it" (Le Masson, 2018: 15). Conflict analysis involves an understanding of the two-way interactions between project activities and the context. BRACED projects were aware of the operational risks of exacerbating social tensions, recognising that tensions could arise if certain groups were excluded from being project beneficiaries, which could in turn increase the risk of project staff being attacked. Being perceived as impartial is particularly important, and this needs to be reflected in the relationships that implementing agencies build and maintain (Christian Aid, 2018: 6). For example, implementing partners can have a substantial impact on the local political economy, and this must be factored into key choices regarding partner and supplier selection.[40]

An illustrative example of this comes from the Myanmar context. The *Rapid Response Research* project was a BRACED Knowledge Manager action research project carried out in BRACED *Myanmar Alliance* project implementation sites, using mobile phone surveys to collect data. The Rapid Response Research project was originally meant to be implemented in Rakhine state, however the location was changed due to security concerns; the mobile phones for the panel survey were purchased from Ooredoo, a company headquartered in Qatar, a Muslim-majority country. Before implementation was due to start, international research staff were warned by the in-country implementing project staff that such phones would not be well received in the target communities in Rakhine. This was at a time of worsening social tensions and the team therefore decided to re-locate the research project to Hpa-An, Kayin State. This meant significant changes to the target communities and the type of climate risks that were assessed, but the experience shows the importance of developing community acceptance strategies and how critical local implementing partners are in supporting this, based on their strong understanding of the context.[41]

Although seemingly obviously, learning from the BRACED programme continually emphasised the importance not only of context analysis but also of consulting beneficiaries to shape and determine project decisions (Le Masson, Benoudji, Sotelo Reyes and Bernard, 2018). What came through strongly across all the BRACED case studies in Mali, Niger, South Sudan and Myanmar for this review is that the process for undertaking activities in the community is as important as the technical intervention, and it is crucial for staff to use tools such as participatory vulnerability and capacity assessments, as these empower individuals and communities to analyse their own problems and offer their own solutions.[42]

For example, the BRACED DCF project in Senegal and Mali placed a strong emphasis on ensuring that relationships with beneficiaries were as inclusive as possible to "enable them to articulate their expectations for enhanced resilience".[43] As part of this, the project was designed to ensure that decisions were taken by the communities themselves, based on their priorities.[44] This was an important part of the conflict-sensitive approach in Mali, recognising that helping one group more than another could increase communal tensions and worsen the overall operating environment.[45]

In the BRACED *Myanmar Alliance* project, regular community engagement was an essential ingredient that ensured effective delivery. The entry point was through participatory 'community resilience assessments' leading to inclusive, prioritised action plans. The process worked well because it was based on the principle that the local context must be understood in detail, and planning must be participatory. To support this, consortium partners had already built strong relationships with the communities before the project started.[46]

Non-BRACED programmes also offer additional lessons and tools. Christian Aid, for example, through the *Linking Preparedness, Resilience and Response* (LPRR) resilience programme that worked in countries facing multiple risks, including those related to climate and conflict, developed the Integrated Conflict Prevention

and Resilience (ICPR) tool. This was used alongside participatory vulnerability and capacity assessments as part of a conflict-sensitive approach in Kenya and Bangladesh (Grene and Cammaer, 2017: 6).

Although not currently standard practice, this review finds that conflict sensitivity should be integrated into planning and preparation of programme activities and operational plans, including recruitment and partnering strategies. There is still progress to be made in regards to the selection of project locations, identification of beneficiaries, selection of partners, and safety and security strategies. Operational safeguards in programme design may involve codes of conduct, standard operating procedures, and coordination mechanisms. Implementing partners and donor representatives at the BRACED-wide Annual Learning Event in Nairobi in 2019 also highlighted the importance of building networks with other programmes and initiatives as part of their conflict sensitivity approaches.

Conflict analysis is not a one-off exercise. It is vital that both the context and the impact of a project are continuously monitored, with corrections made as necessary, tracking the effects of the conflict context on climate resilience programmes and *vice versa*. The 'Climate-related security risks: Towards an integrated approach' report (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2016) noted that although donors have guidelines for building conflict sensitivity into development programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, staff members reported that they often need to balance many different priorities and that it can be challenging for them to "use these tools to develop entirely conflict-sensitive projects" (Mobjörk, Gustafsson, Sonnsjö, Van Baalen, Dellmuth and Bremberg, 2016: 51). The report also revealed that a lack of clarity on the links between climate and conflict was preventing such guidelines from being fully translated into "concrete actions" (Mobjörk, Gustafsson, Sonnsjö, Van Baalen, Dellmuth and Bremberg, 2016: 51). Our findings support that concern.

Coordination and coherence with other programmes and actors

In recent years, the operational challenges of working in complex settings have resulted in calls for more pragmatic project designs and better coordination and coherence with other programmes and actors to facilitate delivery. A lack of coordination between climate resilience, development, humanitarian and peacekeeping programmes working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is believed to undermine both "collective impact" and the ability of donors and implementing agencies to manage risks effectively (OECD, 2016: 64), leading to missed opportunities and programming "silos" (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 9). Much more collaboration is needed, with joint analysis between development and humanitarian agencies, and with all funding, however it is channelled, brought under a "single analytical and strategic umbrella" (Levine and Mosel, 2014: 11).

At a minimum, it is important to identify who is doing what in any given area, and to consider how to strengthen communication mechanisms through greater coordination in the sharing of information to reduce the risk of programme interruption. National UN missions often provide security briefings to international NGOs, although detailed information is not usually shared. Moreover, while coordination mechanisms may already be in place through instruments like the UN Cluster Approach, climate resilience programmes and actors are newer to this space. There needs to be clearer accountability for different roles and responsibilities that support enhanced coordination. The BRACED IRISS project experience in South Sudan also highlights that climate resilience programmes operating in ongoing crisis settings should be plugged into humanitarian and peace-building infrastructure for monitoring and managing risk, and to ensure that the Do No Harm principles are upheld.[47]

Towards integrated programming

The international community is increasingly discussing how to work across silos, including the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, donors and implementing agencies acknowledged the need to better address the interconnected risks posed by climate change, disasters and conflict (OECD, 2018). The UN Secretary-General's prevention agenda is also mobilising a reform process to bring together sustainable development, peace, humanitarian and development sectors (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 7). Such actions require finding synergies between development, humanitarian and peacekeeping, including the combination of expertise across sectors. It is anticipated this will enhance both programmatic effectiveness and operational delivery by improving the effectiveness of partnerships, value for money, and creating joined-up approaches to counter sectoral silos. This has largely been driven by donors proposing that resilience is an overarching framework for integrating climate change with humanitarian aid, poverty reduction and peace-building (Mobjörk, Gustafsson, Sonnsjö, Van Baalen, Dellmuth and Bremberg, 2016: 41). However, it is critical that such a political agenda is translated into practical action whereby climate resilience programming takes a Do No Harm approach and supports a more enabling environment for peace. The idea of linking climate resilience programming to the broader peace-building agenda was relatively new when the BRACED programme was originally designed, but it gained traction during the programme's lifetime.

Climate resilience programmes are however increasingly working in places previously considered the sole domain of humanitarian actors, such as in Mali and Niger. The BRACED programme took an integrated approach to addressing short- and long-term climate shocks and stresses that drive people into poverty, and tested integrated ways of working across climate, humanitarian and development sectors.[48] And whereas this showed significant potential for learning, it also challenged conventional ways of working.[49] In Niger, the separation of actors addressing climate change and actors addressing conflict and insecurity has prevented a blending of climate change adaptation, humanitarian

and peace-building approaches. However, the BRACED SUR1M project has been working with other initiatives to try and bring different actors together so they can share learning on operational and programming experiences,[50] and it was recognised by the non-BRACED Sahel Resilience Learning (SAREL) programme and Les Nigériens Nourrissent les Nigériens (3N) initiative for its work across the humanitarian and development divide. Though the project did not deliver humanitarian aid directly, it did provide small grants to establish early warning groups and supported them to develop and disseminate contingency plans. This happened alongside preventive actions that aimed to strengthen the preparedness of households and communities and support livelihood diversification and the maintenance of critical assets in a context characterised by recurrent food insecurity.

Donors recognise the inter-connectedness of different types of risk, and acknowledge that joint risk assessments across conflict, development and humanitarian issues are a priority. However, work is required to see this reflected in practice, as efforts to work across the humanitarian–development nexus have so far lacked "practical application" by implementing agencies (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 103).

Integrated approaches seek to connect the design, delivery and evaluation of programmes across sectors, as well as aligning humanitarian responses with longer-term development plans. Climate resilience programming contributions to approaches to risk management include for example the use of climate risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities. This is important for operational delivery, but it also challenges conventional ways of working because it requires "blending" expertise from both the conflict and the climate change communities, as well as other relevant disciplines (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 7). It also means taking a broader view of partnerships, developing a deeper knowledge of the context and existing power dynamics, and linking to and understanding the work of organisations engaging more directly in humanitarian, conflict and peace-building work.[51] This requires cross-team working within organisations, across and between the "internal boundaries" of humanitarian and development programming.[52] DFID is increasingly using "resilience thinking" to explore different approaches for longer-term humanitarian programming in protracted crises, such as in Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Marin and Otto Naess, 2017: 19). Some DFID country offices are now encouraging a joined-up approach to resilience through cross-sector teams, for example the humanitarian and climate team in Nepal that also includes staff working on inclusive growth (ICAI, 2018: 14).

Evidence from the BRACED programme highlights that, in practice, integrated programming goes beyond working across sectors, involving the layering and linking of different activities to address multi-sectoral and multidimensional issues (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 7). Operationally, this means including targeting, financing and coordination mechanisms that facilitate cross-sector responses to different types of risks (Ulrichs, 2016: 1). Then there is the question of prioritisation: balancing the need to ensure that climate

change receives adequate attention, while not diverting attention and resources from humanitarian requirements. During humanitarian crises, climate resilience programming may not be appropriate because responding to people's immediate needs takes priority over considerations of longer-term risks, which can limit the scope for introducing forward-looking climate change adaptation (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 9).

For example, during the BRACED IRISS project, South Sudan became an "increasingly humanitarian context", which affected community priorities and therefore project participation.[53] As one actor said, "Sometimes you would learn that there was going to be attacks – places would empty out. So, if your population is mobile then there is not going to be programming. However, we monitored people coming back and then resumed or adjusted activities as the context would dictate".[54] As is typical in climate resilience programmes working with pastoralists, migration of project participants due to drought and food insecurity was also a challenge more generally. According to a BRACED Fund Manager representative, there were many cases where beneficiaries could not participate in project activities because there was a food drop happening nearby, which was part of the reason for project restructuring to include a cash-for-assets component.[55]

While the relative importance and appropriate sequencing of actions will vary according to context, coordination and capacity-building across peace, humanitarian, development and climate action is an urgent priority (OECD, 2018). Taking a multidimensional approach, working with multiple actors and delivering across scales to address long-term needs and priorities is often beyond the capacity of any single organisation. That is without even taking into account the need to navigate the operational complexities of working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This points to the requirement for integrated approaches that balance what is essential in climate resilience programming with what is feasible in practice, and with the most effective approaches and processes within each context. Operationally, this means reducing the risk of project disruption through joint cross-sectoral analysis to ensure that corresponding responses are planned with a broader and longer-term perspective (Levine and Mosel, 2014: 9).

> "If the places where humanitarian organisations operate are also the ones facing the highest climate risk, yet getting the least support, it would also make sense to deploy humanitarian delivery mechanisms, first of all simply to help people in those places cope with the risks they already face today but also to support them to be more resilient in the face of changing risks. This would address the double vulnerability of climate and conflict, and may even contribute to reducing some of the pressures that could contribute to future tensions and conflict" (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 14).

The question remains, however, as to how to work alongside humanitarian programmes and how to consider longer-term climate resilient approaches. "Resilience" is an increasingly popular term among humanitarian actors, but there are still institutional barriers to linking humanitarian action and climate change adaptation (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 10). It is also important to ensure that funding flows support integrated programming; separate funding approaches to peace-building, humanitarian response, climate change and development undermine integrated approaches (Crawford, Dazé, Hammill, Parry and Zamudio, 2015: 9). There is clearly scope for improving the coordination of different financing flows in fragile contexts, and combining humanitarian assistance with long-term development finance.

Moreover, humanitarian programming has existing protocols in place, for example the Core Humanitarian Standard that sets out guiding principles for organisations involved in humanitarian activities, including "neutrality" as one of four main principles that guide humanitarian action. However, addressing climate change impacts requires acknowledging and addressing the root drivers of vulnerability, which "necessitates action on issues of politics, power and inequitable resource distribution" (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 10). This challenges the humanitarian principle of neutrality and operational independence (Marin and Otto Naess, 2017: 11).

A 'crisis modifier' offers a means for development and humanitarian actors to work together to address multiple risks (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 12), used by BRACED to address unanticipated humanitarian needs that arose during the course of the programme. At the end of 2015, when programme implementation was already underway, DFID linked the (non-BRACED) Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Sahelian Emergencies (PHASE) humanitarian fund to the nine BRACED projects in the Sahel region. The aim was to protect development gains the projects had already made by enabling them to access funding for early action and rapid response to unanticipated humanitarian needs. PHASE-funded activities were implemented separately to ongoing activities that continued alongside or halted during crisis periods. The majority of proposals

Lessons learned from the BRACED experience with the PHASE crisis modifier (BRACED Knowledge Manager, 'Crisis Modifiers', 2017):

- Crisis modifiers are appropriate for development or resilience projects working in areas with a history of extensive, predictable risks.
- Crisis modifiers are not simply a 'bolt-on' to climate resilient programmes. Working to address crises requires a fundamental shift in the ways that development actors design, think and act.
- To be effective, crisis modifiers should be deployed alongside adaptive programming approaches, to ensure there is sufficient flexibility to deal with transitions towards recovery and 'back to normal' development programming.

received and funded by PHASE within BRACED responded to climate-related events such as flooding and food insecurity. The BRACED Livestock Mobility project however, was affected by conflict-related displacement of pastoralists and their families from Côte d'Ivoire and responded to the subsequent refugee crisis in Burkina Faso (see Theme 3, Adapting to Challenges, for further details).

Building social cohesion

There is emergent evidence supporting the potential for climate change adaptation to support peace-building by being a conflict "threat minimiser" and the linkages between social cohesion and resilience are increasingly recognised. Initiatives designed to support people's capacity to better cope with conflict-, displacement- and climate-related shocks may also help promote social cohesion and strengthen local governance structures (International Alert, 2015).[56] It may not always be appropriate for climate resilience programmes to mediate between groups in the middle of active and violent conflict, but these programmes may be able to help build bridges where tensions are high and mistrust commonplace. This can make an important contribution towards conflict prevention, enabling uninterrupted programming alongside other contextual benefits.

The BRACED business case showed an expectation from DFID that the programme would have a positive effect on fragile and conflict-affected contexts by "reducing the impacts of climate related disasters which can be a contributing factor to instability and conflict".[57] Beyond this, there is emerging evidence that in some cases, BRACED projects "are changing the contexts in which they operate", for example by promoting the inclusion of marginalised groups in decision-making platforms, which supported social cohesion and contributed to an enabling environment for peace-building. This was largely achieved through activities that created shared space for dialogue and planning within and between communities, contributing to improved social relations (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 66).

Some examples from BRACED in this review are anecdotal and arguably represent unintended consequences of project activities. In South Sudan, the BRACED IRISS project brought together groups traditionally divided by conflict, with one team member commenting that "it's one of those things we can't measure, but there are groups taking part in the project that are made up of three ethnicities… so just the fact that they're meeting on a weekly basis prevents more ethnic tension".[58] In Niger, the BRACED SUR1M project established early warning groups that helped traditional leaders and the national police in the commune of Bankilaré to prevent and manage community conflict by alerting clan leaders to risks of intercommunal violence. In one case, this led to clan leaders notifying the police about potential aggressors, who were then arrested and had their weapons confiscated. Early warning groups also supported local authorities in conducting a community sensitisation campaign to reduce conflict.[59] In Ethiopia, the BRACED *Market Approaches to Resilience* (MAR) project had a positive impact on inter-tribe conflict by supporting participatory natural resource management, which reduced resource competition (Wilson, Yaron and Béné, 2018: 53).

The cross-Sahel BRACED Livestock Mobility project explicitly built conflict reduction into its design, facilitating land tenure and resource management agreements to reduce conflicts along cross-border livestock routes (Leavy, Boydell, McDowell and Sladkova, 2018: 93). This was achieved in part by increasing knowledge and understanding of pastoralist livelihoods, improving relations and negotiating agreements between farmers and pastoralists regarding livestock movement, and supported the integration of pastoralist interests in local planning and policies (Silva Villanueva, Phillips Itty and Sword-Daniels, 2018: 28). One project stakeholder said about the project's success: "In the years before this project, we were overwhelmed with complaints and the management of conflict cases between breeders and farmers… Now that the livestock corridors are secure, we have registered fewer complaints and conflicts in our commune".[60]

4. ADAPTING TO CHALLENGES

Image: United Nations Mission in South Sudan

The third theme is about adapting to challenges related to delivery of climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts through flexible programming that supports working within contexts of uncertainty and responding to a changing operating environment. Experience from the BRACED programme shows that adapting project activities to contextual challenges is essential for effective delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. During the programme, DFID trialled the use of a 'crisis modifier' that linked Sahel-based BRACED projects with a humanitarian fund to increase access to contingency funding to protect project gains and address emerging humanitarian needs during emergent crises. This demonstrated the need to ensure that programming itself is shock-proof, through effective contingency planning and flexible funding mechanisms.

Principles and approaches to adaptive management, programming and delivery

The literature suggests that donors and implementing agencies can support change in challenging contexts, if they align their thinking and practices with the reality that change is complex (Booth and Unsworth, 2014: 3). Adaptive programming means operating flexibly in response to changing operating environments and incorporating feedback from lessons learned to ensure

evidence-based decision-making. This is based on the understanding that complex problems can only be solved by learning and adaptation, which means that programmes must adopt an iterative approach, regularly revisiting their theories of change, conducting analysis, working with local implementing teams and partners, and carrying out frequent monitoring and learning – all of which must be supported by systems and processes. Mechanisms to support adaptive delivery include the allocation of funding to learning, sequencing implementation to allow for review and reflection, and incorporating regular cycles of revisions into project management. This has major implications for funding and staffing levels, the type of expertise required, and the delegation of decision-making authority and responsibility.

Box 5. Adaptive programming: thinking and working politically and doing development differently

Adaptive approaches such as 'problem-driven iterative adaptation' (PDIA), 'doing development differently' and 'thinking and working politically' all come from an understanding of the need to blend design and implementation in rapid cycles of planning, action and review. Such adaptive approaches recognise that this should be supported by ongoing analysis of the political economy, with the scope to change the direction of a project based on what is learnt or in response to an evolving operating environment (O'Donnell, 2016; Wild, Booth and Valters, 2017). Responses to complex issues as found in fragile and conflict-affected contexts need to be iterative, and common features are that: (i) context is everything, (ii) 'best fit' is not necessarily good practice, (iii) no set blueprint approach, (iv) a focus on opportunities for real-time learning, (v) long-term commitments through staff continuity, and (vi) locally led interventions and approaches (Teskey, 2017: 5).

Looking outside the BRACED programme, the 'Action for empowerment and accountability' (A4EA) research project led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) has explored adaptive approaches for programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It developed the concept of an 'adaptive triangle' (see Box 6) to show how adaptation must be integrated into all levels of programme design, management and delivery to ensure effectiveness. When this works well, the adaptive triangle leads to an enabling environment where donors and implementing partners can talk openly about what is and what is not working. The A4EA research project looked at three (non-BRACED) project case studies: the Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) project in Nigeria, the Institutions 4 Inclusive Development (I4ID) project in Tanzania, and Pyoe Pin in Myanmar. These governance programmes all have transferable lessons for other types of programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and show that adaptation is necessary, though never easy, in such environments.

Box 6. The 'adaptive triangle' for delivery, programming and management

Adaptive delivery blends short-term learning, thinking and decision-making. This requires frontline staff to apply evidence and judgement to make on-the-ground decisions, often navigating through complexity and uncertainty. This takes more than technical skills, requiring emotional intelligence, facilitation and influencing skills, and the ability to read signals and be flexible (Christie and Green, 2018: 16). In the BRACED programme, implementing partners undertook adaptive delivery through their in-country teams.

Adaptive programming is a more structured process of reflection and strategy development, which both supports and holds adaptive delivery teams to account. This requires trust and understanding within and between teams, with managers shielding their frontline staff from bureaucratic structures and requirements that inhibit adaptive delivery. It also requires the ability to challenge and limit the risks associated with 'improvisation' (Christie and Green, 2018: 19). When applied to the BRACED programme, it was the Fund Manager who undertook adaptive programming, simultaneously supporting and holding the implementing partners to account.

Adaptive management is about how the donor designs, procures and manages programmes in a way that enables effective and adaptive programming and delivery. This requires a champion, i.e. someone who can navigate the internal systems and has the experience and confidence to promote adaptive ways of working in the face of institutional challenges. As applied to the BRACED programme, it was DFID who used adaptive management, creating an enabling environment for the Fund Manager and implementing partners.

Responding and adapting to changing context is a key enabling process for climate resilience programmes in any context. This is because building resilience is highly context-specific and so allowing projects to change course gives them a "better chance of success", not only because contexts evolve but also because, as BRACED has shown, "we are still learning through implementation experience".[61] A key assumption in the BRACED theory of change was that projects are affected by many exogenous factors, and that it is important to take these into account, responding to the climate, as well as political and socioeconomic contexts (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 50).

This review found that adaptive and flexible programming approaches are particularly important for climate resilience programmes in fragile and

conflict-affected contexts because of the high level of unpredictability and uncertainty involved. This is also because people's priorities and opportunities are increasingly evolving in such contexts (Levine and Mosel, 2014: 15). One practitioner reflecting on the need for adaptive and flexible approaches in South Sudan points out "Particularly in an environment like South Sudan, adaptive management is not optional" but rather a "required way of working" (Centre for Development Results, 2018: 18). This means that budgets and programme designs must be flexible enough to accommodate change at various levels. It is also important that monitoring and evaluation systems can demonstrate results without becoming overly restrictive for implementing partners.[62] Additionally, there should be a clear process for revisiting original project targets, which may involve adjusting logframes and assumptions upon which interventions are based (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 98).

Delivering through partnerships, particularly those including local organisations, allows for continuity amid conflict (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 56). This was a key finding across all BRACED case studies in this review, supported by literature that shows that greater flexibility in partnership modalities allows projects to overcome contextual changes and engage more effectively with new groups. But there is still a need to expand the way that partnerships are considered and to explore ways of working with informal networks in agile ways through an improved understanding of changing dynamics.

There is increasing donor support for flexible, iterative, adaptive programming approaches. A recent USAID paper, for example, presented a framework for collaborating, learning, and adapting (CLA), that is being integrated into programme planning and delivery. DFID has also taken steps to streamline approval processes through its 'Smart Rules' (DFID, 2019), suggesting a move towards more adaptive approaches, including a recognition that logframes are not required if an alternative results framework is provided.

However, deeper institutional changes are needed to support this approach. Donors, consultants, implementing agencies and NGOs tend to struggle with adaptive approaches because there is an inherent tension between adaptiveness and the pressure for predictability, risk avoidance and results. Other obstacles include spending targets, concerns about transparency and accountability, and a lack of clarity over expectations and risk appetites. Adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts requires improvements in how projects are overseen. Yet, whereas DFID has expressed a commitment to working more effectively and on a larger scale in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, government-wide fiscal constraints have resulted in budget cuts (OECD, 2016: 35).

Processes within donors and implementing agencies also make it more difficult to support adaptive programming in the long term, or as an ODI report points out, "flexibility is constrained by the current logic of programming" (Levine and Mosel, 2014: 15). This is because success is judged against a project's objectives (reinforced by logframes), changing plans indicate failure, and risk is assumed to be only hypothetical (Teskey, 2017). The BRACED programme experience was that logframes have major limitations in complex adaptive programmes in terms

of capturing the quality of outputs and putting them into context.[63] A DFID representative pointed out that there is recognition within the Department that "strict logframes are not suitable for fragile contexts and flexible programmes" (KII 25). However, this could be supplemented with more positive guidance from donors on available models for adaptive working to provide staff from both donors and implementing partners with more support and confidence to try different approaches to adaptive management, programming and delivery.

Finally, even if donors understand the need for flexibility and adaptability at the outset of a programme, changes in personnel and priorities make it harder to maintain the necessary commitment within the time available to achieve real change in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. As one BRACED stakeholder noted, "Let's say you have five pilots and three are really not working, and you say we can push on or we can stop – which means renegotiating the plan and the budget – maybe your people have changed and the donor's people have changed, and then you just keep on doing the same thing" (KII 24).

Looking beyond the BRACED programme, a research team found that DFID staff played pioneering roles in establishing the adaptive *Pyoe Pin* programme in Myanmar by creating a strong enabling environment that allowed it to test different approaches without being pushed too early for results. However, they questioned whether, 10 years on, DFID would be able to replicate this approach, arguing that the donor currently has more of a "procurement + compliance mindset" (Christie and Green, 2018: 20). One suggestion in the literature is that donors and implementing agencies should be held to account for the degree to which they are able to adapt their original plans, i.e. that adaptiveness should be encouraged and made into a "contractual obligation" (Levine and Mosel, 2014).

Adaptive management, programming and delivery in practice

While proposals for climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts should always be grounded in strong contextual analysis, experience from BRACED shows that the operating context will continue to evolve in unexpected and unpredictable ways and so there is a need to also take an adaptive and iterative approach to both programming and operational delivery. During the course of BRACED, most projects changed their delivery plans due to the changing contexts they operated in, as well as in response to lessons learned from implementation.[64]

A key learning from BRACED is the importance of capturing **how** and **how much** projects are adapting to context. In BRACED programme documents, several of the projects (*Livestock Mobility*, BRICS, IRISS and WYL) are listed as projects that are adaptive (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 50). However, from reading the programme documents alone, the review's authors found it difficult to tell exactly how adaptive the BRACED programme was in practice – in other words, how much the projects changed, to what extent this was due to operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and how actual implementation differed

as compared to the original design. The review team therefore consulted with members of the implementing teams at both field- and head office-level, as well as the BRACED Fund Manager to complete the picture.

The review found that – overall – BRACED projects had to adapt interventions as practical constraints and implementing partners' understanding of operating contexts developed. Adaptations usually related to what projects were planning to do regarding methodology (timing, location, cost and sequencing of activities) and how they planned to work (remotely, locally, through outsourcing, through sub-grantees, with government). For example, when insecurity restricted access to certain areas in Sudan, the BRACED *Building Resilience in Chad and Sudan* (BRICS) project adopted a different model for gathering monitoring information through collaboration between Tufts University, the Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency, and local community-based organisations, which proved to be an effective approach to working in such a protracted conflict setting (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 53). Another example of how BRACED projects adapted to insecurity are the WYL and SUR1M projects in Mali: following a government ban on motorbikes at night, project staff were severely limited in their ability to reach project sites and instead had to make overnight trips to access remote locations.[65]

In terms of adaptive programming, the BRACED programme's mid-term review offered an opportunity to take stock and course correct. In the BRACED *Myanmar Alliance* project, the challenging and rapidly changing operating context meant project set-up and building relationships took longer than anticipated; the mid-term review recommended accelerating some activities and revising or cancelling others that could not be completed within the following year. The project team then decided to conduct a restructure, which included updating budgets, work plans and activities, and improving ways of working.[66]

The BRACED IRISS project in South Sudan changed and adapted frequently and significantly throughout its lifetime. Given that the political and social dynamics in the country were extremely fluid, the project team were clear from the beginning that they would need to have a flexible and iterative approach to their work. The operating context remained in flux throughout implementation and evolved in unpredictable ways. Some changes were community-led, such as when dealing with the problem of cash savings losing value due to hyperinflation; village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) established by the project paid out savings in hard assets like livestock and loaned out more money to members. An IRISS team member explained, "If they kept cash then it was going to lose its value, which meant they needed to keep the loans out. So everything that came in, you had to immediately loan out".[67]

Other IRISS project changes were more fundamental and required interaction between the BRACED programme team, Fund Manager and DFID. One year from the end of the programme, the project had an anticipated underspend of £1 million, due in part to delays related to operating in a conflict context and being overly optimistic about what could be delivered within this setting. The implementing team were encouraged by the Fund Manager to reflect on

what was realistic and to revise activities accordingly for the time remaining. As a result, the project cut several activities considered less relevant in the changed context and were granted a six-month no-cost extension to complete their work; this had implications for the number of beneficiaries reached and the overall BRACED logframe.[68]

Shortly after this restructuring, the BRACED IRISS project submitted a proposal to add a cash-for-assets component. The combination of the scale of the funding request, the humanitarian, non-traditional resilience-building nature of the work, the violent conflict context, and the recent project restructuring made it a unique proposition that required direct consideration by DFID. The Fund Manager worked with DFID South Sudan to check on the feasibility of the proposal, and the "humanitarian plus" angle meant that it was approved. Lessons were learned, however, from the protracted proposal development and sign-off processes, and a Fund Manager representative noted the importance of Fund Managers being set up to facilitate the allocation of contingency budgets and to respond within humanitarian timescales.[69]

The need for "measured flexibility" when implementing resilience programmes in contexts like South Sudan is a clear theme, but implementing partners knew this was not just the opportunity to do whatever they wanted, as flexibility needs to be "carefully managed".[70] The BRACED IRISS project responded to heightened insecurity by moving at-risk staff and partners to work remotely. The "level of engagement was affected – [with] more remote engagement when security [was] high and taking opportunities to engage when security permitted it".[71] Once the security situation normalised, the implementation partner gave priority to these areas, focusing on catching up and even speeding up activities.[72] The Fund Manager noted in a report to DFID: "In both IRISS and BRICS [the other BRACED project led by Concern], Concern has been able to deploy surge personnel to cover specific needs or staffing gaps at short notice. This ability helps the project counter the challenges of staff recruitment and retention which are more challenging in [these] fragile and conflict-affected contexts".[73] Overall, the outputs and outcomes from the IRISS project remained relatively stable throughout implementation, even as inputs and activities were adjusted.

In terms of adaptive programming, the BRACED Fund Manager recognised that a more flexible approach to fund management was necessary in the ever-changing contexts in which the programme operated. Given its role in "setting the rules" (within the overall DFID boundaries), the Fund Manager was key to enabling (or limiting) project flexibility.[74] The Fund Manager states that BRACED was more adaptive than it first appears, with an adaptive fund management approach based on trust and flexibility.[75] In addition, feedback from implementing partners was generally very positive about the Fund Manager's willingness to be flexible in response to challenges and evolving operating contexts.[76] However, there were some misunderstandings regarding the amount of flexibility allowed, due largely to the fact that "everything had to be programmed"; in other words, all budget lines had to contribute to specific outputs/deliverables because that was "the hard and fast DFID rule" (KII 10). There was a relatively high degree of flexibility, with projects able to

make changes of up to +/– 10% per budget category, and more with requested approval, but project teams often made requests to the Fund Manager without realising that they did not need to ask permission (KII 10). A Fund Manager representative agreed: "I'm not 100% sure that all projects necessarily [knew] they [had] the ability to use this possibility" while also noting that this was included in guidance issued to project teams. This is attributed to organisational culture – "It comes down to the individuals and teams involved and their openness/willingness to admit that something isn't working or that they need to rethink their approach" (KII 27) – which is seen as a key enabler of adaptive programming, alongside approaches and systems.

The emphasis on compliance by the Fund Manager and DFID was viewed as important but difficult in fragile settings. A Fund Manager representative observed that there were always good reasons for re-budgeting and restructuring projects, but that this was "a huge amount of work and an added complexity if you are already working in a complex environment" (KII 10). For example, proposal development and sign-off processes for restructuring the BRACED IRISS project to include the cash-for-assets component took several months of negotiation between the Fund Manager, DFID and the project team.[77]

In BRACED, there seemed to be a mismatch in expectations regarding the level of compliance expected by the donor/Fund Manager, and the level of flexibility wanted by implementing partners to be better able to adapt to changing contexts and make the most of emerging opportunities. Although there was flexibility in theory, there were mixed experiences regarding how this worked in practice. An understanding of projects and their contexts by the donor and Fund Manager based on established relationships and open communication was considered vital; as one project stakeholder noted, "If you want to be quick, adaptive and flexible, there needs to be fewer rather than more procedures in place. It is about a level of trust".[78]

Project representatives also emphasised the importance of all stakeholders engaging in ongoing dialogue and viewing context-related issues "not just as obstacles to be overcome but as challenges that must be addressed".[79] BRACED projects were encouraged to adopt adaptive approaches to implementation and had to adjust as staff learned about opportunities and challenges. However, while most projects learned by doing, there appears to have been little systematic reflection and revisiting of underlying assumptions, which is key to adaptive programming (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 8).

Flexibility and adaptability to shocks, including the use of crisis modifiers

Flexibility is needed to ensure that programming itself in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is resilient to shocks and stresses in places where crisis is not a "peripheral possibility" but an actuality (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 6). Many BRACED projects faced crisis conditions multiple times during implementation, but DFID did not allow contingency budget lines, and despite projects working

in some of the world's most fragile contexts, it was not a requirement to lay out contingency plans in the design phase (KII 10).

Experience from BRACED projects highlights how resilience programmes cannot ignore worsening or crisis conditions during implementation (Leavy, Boydell and McDowell, 2017: 9). Those operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts were impacted by political instability such as in Burkina Faso, Mali and South Sudan, as well as climate shocks including those resulting from the 2014–2016 El Niño event in East Africa. Some BRACED projects worked to meet immediate needs alongside longer-term programme objectives that included the reallocation of project resources to support humanitarian-related activities (Leavy, Boydell and McDowell, 2017: 9).

There was emphasis on the importance of having the flexibility to enable implementing partners to access additional funding in order to respond to emerging humanitarian needs, whether conflict-related or climate-related, and in some cases, to pause or reduce business-as-usual activities. This was demonstrated, for example, through BRACED project use of the Sahel crisis modifier. DFID introduced a crisis modifier for the BRACED programme in 2016, enabling projects to access contingency funding from the Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Sahelian Emergencies (PHASE) programme to respond to unexpected shocks in project sites in an attempt to protect development gains.[80] Crisis modifiers allow a recipient agency to use a certain percentage of an overall budget for relief. The intention being to allow partners to quickly shift their activities depending on where needs are the greatest, rather than being bound by earmarked budgets that may not be relevant under changing circumstances (Cabot Venton and Sida, 2017).

Known as the BRACED Contingency Fund, this mechanism allowed Sahel-based BRACED projects to apply for additional humanitarian funds (up to £250,000) where they assessed that a humanitarian crisis such as a weather-related, food security or conflict-induced crisis, was threatening or adversely affecting project activities.[81] A review of the use of PHASE contingency funding to respond to conflict-related displacement in Burkina Faso, flooding in Mali and food insecurity in Niger emphasised the importance of anticipating threats independent of additional PHASE support, with the BRACED Knowledge Manager noting that "When employed effectively, crisis modifiers offer a practical means to enable early action and response to emerging crises" (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 6).

There were eight PHASE-funded interventions with a total value of £1.5 million.[82] The organisational capacity of BRACED implementing partners was crucial for the success of interventions funded, including prior knowledge of the situation on the ground and experience working there. Evaluative learning found that interventions under PHASE maintained resilience trajectories and reduced pressures on beneficiaries who might have otherwise become disengaged, as well as, in some cases, enabling a peaceful operating context necessary for continuing with resilience-building initiatives (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 6). Evidence shows that crisis-modifier-funded interventions also enhanced BRACED

project relationships and reputation with communities and local authorities, bringing a range of otherwise intangible benefits including increased trust and social capital, that in turn enhanced the operating environment (Peters and Pichon, 2017: 7). See Box 7 below for more detail about using the PHASE crisis modifier to respond to conflict-related displacement in Burkina Faso.

Box 7. Using the PHASE crisis modifier to respond to conflict-related displacement in Burkina Faso

The PHASE crisis modifier was used by the BRACED *Livestock Mobility* project to respond to a sudden outbreak of violence in Côte d'Ivoire in 2016 and the resulting refugee crisis along pastoral corridors in Burkina Faso, where the project was operating. This was the only BRACED project to explicitly access PHASE funds to manage a crisis induced by conflict rather than climate-related shocks and stresses. However, it was also indirectly climate related: the conflict in Cote-d'Ivoire was the result of tensions between pastoralists and farmers over access to land, and the influx of refugees risked exacerbating similar pressures on natural resources in Burkina Faso. The PHASE intervention complemented the implementing partner's BRACED work. Once the crisis was over, and the context more enabling, the project was able to continue with its core work of negotiating and securing pastoral corridors (Peters and Pichon, 2017).

The idea that flexible funding mechanisms lead to timely responses – but only if triggered early enough – is reiterated in the literature. Looking beyond BRACED, some DFID programmes in protracted crises have developed innovative approaches by building financial flexibility into budgets which enable them to respond to sudden spikes in need. In Somalia for example, DFID set aside £10 million a year at the country office level to fund activities before a crisis developed or to fund rapid responses in the event of sudden shocks (Rohwerder, 2017: 8). The benefits of contingency funding within projects have also been highlighted by the non-BRACED Revitalizing agricultural/pastoral incomes and new markets (RAIN) project in Ethiopia, with the project's contingency fund considered as enormously helpful for immediate response (Rohwerder, 2017: 6). However, approval systems for flexible funding mechanisms can still take too long, indicating the importance of ensuring that they are responsive and flexible during implementation; a 2016 National Audit Office report found that 25% of all DFID teams responding to crises in the previous three years reported that they spent too much time seeking approval (Rohwerder, 2017: 8).

BRACED projects that submitted proposals to access PHASE funding found that the time needed for decision-making, contracting and disbursement of funding resulted in approval delays. The BRACED Fund Manager took on the

additional function of managing the contingency fund at no added cost to DFID.[83] However, the up-to-five-weeks required to process an application was much longer than the two weeks originally envisaged. This was because most applications received were not straightforward humanitarian activities, but a blend of emergency and development assistance. Overall, the more complex the intervention, the more time that was needed in reviewing and clarifying the proposal.[84] The BRACED experience suggests that crisis modifiers can support a more flexible aid system, but only if managers can disburse funds quickly and efficiently. It is important to note that in April 2018, DFID decided to discontinue this fund for the extension period, observing that "a strong and clear line of communication from partners on the ground up the contracting chain to DFID is needed to flag any early concerns around possible crises to ensure that other humanitarian mechanisms can be triggered."[85]

The rationale for why the BRACED Contingency Fund was discontinued is not fully documented, given that findings from evaluative learning were considered as broadly positive. According to a BRACED Fund Manager representative, "an opportunity has been missed to either tweak, change or refine the mechanism based on feedback" (KII 27). However, BRACED project stakeholders considered the use of contingency budgets at project level to be the fastest and most effective way to respond to humanitarian crises, rather than applying to a centrally held contingency fund which was viewed as comparatively slow and bureaucratic.[86]

Mechanisms that enable early action in combination with longer-term vulnerability reduction are considered by some as a "radical" shift in ways of working within a humanitarian system that is primarily response-driven (Peters, Mayhew, Slim, Van Aalst and Arrighi, 2019: 12). Good examples from other programmes with in-built flexibility include: (i) multi-year funding with flexibility within budget categories, (ii) contingency funds or crisis modifiers with processes in place to allow rapid shifts in activities, (iii) pre-financed emergency preparedness plans, and (iv) forecast-based financing mechanisms with predefined actions initiated on the basis of agreed triggers. For example, the Red Cross, along with UN partners, NGOs and research organisations, have developed the "forecast-based financing" mechanism, enabling access to funding for early action and preparedness activities based on weather forecasting and risk analyses. A pre-agreed package of support and financing is provided when a forecast trigger is reached, using Standard Operating Procedures agreed by a technical committee including scientists, humanitarian actors and local authorities.

Most flexible funding mechanisms included in the literature focus on responding to rapid-onset climate-related shocks and stresses, rather than conflict shocks and protracted crises. Anticipating triggers to violence is a further challenge; with an assumption being that climate-related disasters are easier to predict and respond to effectively (Marin and Otto Naess, 2017: 23). The Start Fund's 'Crisis anticipation window' enables members to anticipate anthropogenic and natural crises, and to respond early and quickly to minimise impact. However, Start Fund representatives have observed that

its allocation decision-making processes have "struggled to be consistent around chronic crises" (Rohwerder, 2017: 11).

Box 8. The Start Fund and election violence in Kenya (START Network, 2017)

The Start Fund is a global contingency fund that enables humanitarian response within 72 hours of an alert, rather than the average 17 days for other grants in rapid-onset crises, making it the fastest, collectively owned, early response mechanism in the world. In 2017, the Start Fund's 'Crisis anticipation window' funded a response for anticipating election-related violence and displacement during and following the Kenya presidential elections in June 2017, two months before the scheduled elections. Start members agreed it would be useful to conduct an inter-agency analysis and decided that World Vision's 'Good enough context analysis for rapid response' (GECARR) tool would be the most appropriate, with the analysis undertaken on 5–14 July, funded through the Start Fund's Analysis for Action grant.

One of the three anticipated scenarios from the analysis unfolded between August and November 2017. The 'alert' for £500,000 was raised on 17 July by ActionAid, with the support of other agencies, and the allocation decision of £300,000 was made the following day. After this, four project proposals were submitted, with selection made on 24 July. The committee agreed to award the full budget request of £286,065 to a consortium proposal involving ten Start Fund agencies, that began within a week. Given the recalled election on 26 October, Start Fund members then requested that project activities were extended until the second election concluded in November 2017.

More research is required on the use of flexible funding mechanisms for conflict-related shocks. For example, it is suggested that contingency mechanisms require improved coordination with government structures, but this could pose challenges if responding to conflict-related shocks (Rohwerder, 2017: 3). This is certainly an area that warrants further research.



5. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING

Image: USAID

This section consolidates the learning from the three themes and reflects on what is appropriate and feasible within fragile and conflict-affected contexts: the 'so what?' question. As explored in preceding sections, it is not easy to operate in places where climate-related risks interact with pre-existing conflict and instability. The BRACED programme found that its focus on climate-related shocks and stresses tended to overshadow consideration of a broader set of socioeconomic, cultural and political contextual factors related to operating in fragile and conflict-affected areas.

The climate resilience community is relatively new to programming in these contexts, and so the BRACED programme was one of the first to consider adaptation at scale in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Knowing that there are fundamental issues that need to be considered when operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – relative to relatively peaceful and stable settings – this section considers what is feasible and what lessons can be learnt for future programming.

What is feasible and what approaches are needed?

There is a continuing debate regarding whether building climate resilience in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is appropriate, and if so, feasible from a programming perspective. As seen in Theme 2 on Absorbing Impacts, there is also a question on whether climate resilience programmes should seek to directly address issues of fragility or weak governance, or even proactively pursue peace-building goals in these contexts. These are technical questions that go beyond the scope of this review, but there are related operational aspects to consider. The BRACED programme identified four enabling processes through which projects built resilience. Box 9 considers these from an operational perspective in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The enabling processes are further explored throughout this section.

Box 9. Enabling processes for building resilience from an operational perspective

The four enabling processes identified by BRACED for building resilience are set out below (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 6). We have added commentary alongside each from an operational perspective in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, based on the experiences of the case study projects in Mali, Myanmar, Niger and South Sudan.

1. **Layering and linking a set of processes and activities.** When applied to operational delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, starting with the basics and then building on this is a more feasible approach. While having the additional complexity of a broad range of activities is a challenge in such contexts, it does allow a level of risk mitigation, continuity and flexibility. If the context disrupts programming, this can be to a lesser extent if not all activities are affected, and if there is a need to halt some activities due to specific factors, starting with a broader base provides more options for projects to feasibly continue.

2. **Including the most vulnerable and marginalised to address inequalities.** Applied to operational delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the feasibility of reaching the most vulnerable and marginalised is questioned, for safe access, affordability and political reasons. These people are more likely to be harder to reach and it may take more time to see results. This requires commitment from both donors and implementing agencies, which can be enabled by working with and through local partner organisations.

3. **Responding and adapting to changing contexts.** From an operational delivery perspective, working in a responsive and adaptive way is

a necessity in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This will help ensure the safety and security of project staff and ensure the continued relevance and feasibility of interventions in unpredictable contexts that are in constant flux. Working with and through local partners improves contextual awareness and understanding. It also enables programming in areas and under circumstances that non-locals may not consider safe to operate in.

4. **Scaling and embedding efforts into ongoing governmence processes.** This is possibly the most challenging resilience-building process, when applied to operational delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In the BRACED programme, partnerships with governments were particularly important for increasing credibility, generating buy-in and laying foundations for project sustainability, all of which supported operational delivery,[87] with experience showing the importance of working with technical rather than political aspects of government.

Experience from BRACED projects suggests that it is possible to promote longer-term thinking and build aspects of resilience in fragile and conflict-affected contexts when operating in areas of relative stability. The BRACED WYL project in Mali, for example, implemented resilience-building activities in communities despite various challenges during the course of the project, including: (i) threats by armed gangs, (ii) restrictions on the use of motorcycles and cars, (iii) restrictions on activities by women, (iv) government and school closures, and (v) the presence of opposition groups within target communities.[88] Identifying the contexts that are stable enough to receive different types of assistance is something being considered by DFID in light of a security incident; where there is a certain level of stability, "the resilience model starts to become more workable", according to an adviser from DFID.[89]

In addition, similar to having a portfolio of different activities, having more than one operational area, with different risk profiles, can provide a level of risk mitigation, continuity and flexibility in programming. However, the ripple effect of broader violent conflict or other crises elsewhere in a country should not be underestimated. The BRACED IRISS project in South Sudan had two main geographical areas of implementation with distinct political and governance profiles, as well as operations in the capital, Juba. In instances when programming in one or other areas was disrupted, it could generally continue in the other. However, despite operating areas being disconnected from the capital city both politically and economically, with food and products often coming from neighbouring Sudan, they continued being "negatively affected" by the worsening security and economic situation in the wider country.[90] Even in relatively stable contexts, violent conflict still needs to be considered as an ongoing risk due to potential downstream effects. That being said, despite significant operational challenges, two of the IRISS implementing partners plan to continue delivering

climate resilience interventions in BRACED operating areas (subject to funding), which is an indication of the value and feasibility of doing this work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Experience also shows that ongoing development activities may need to be complemented or substituted with interventions that are more humanitarian in nature in times of peak crises. This supports the earlier observation in this review (see Theme 3 on Adapting to Challenges) that the types of programming that are appropriate and feasible will probably change and will continue to do so over time depending on how the context evolves.

It may be that there are more appropriate times to introduce climate resilience projects in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. One practitioner based on their experiences of the non-BRACED Linking Preparedness, Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) project, reflected that resilience-building activities are not appropriate in active conflict zones (KII 30). However, both the BRACED project in South Sudan and the LPRR project in Kenya and Pakistan found that resilience activities, when introduced at the right time, can be an effective entry point for working with conflict-affected populations.

This review identified a series of requirements and critical success factors to support effective operational delivery and make climate resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts more feasible.

1. Climate resilience programming requires pragmatic, realistic and stepwise approaches

Programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, whatever the sector, requires pragmatism and a focus on what can be done, rather than what should be done. One BRACED stakeholder suggested that once the decision has been made to work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the programme should have been designed with this reality in mind (KII 5). Achieving this in practice, however, depends on buy-in from both donors and implementing partners to enable an honest appraisal and ongoing communication of what is feasible.

As noted in Box 9 above, BRACED projects found that the approach of climate resilience activities based on incremental layering and sequencing of actions and processes was appropriate, given the contexts, to effect resilient change. This review found that appropriate layering and sequencing is even more necessary in fragile and conflict-affected contexts where there is limited capacity to deliver complex programmes. As a project implementing partner highlighted, resilience projects operating in such contexts should "start with the absolute basics and build on them, rather than imposing a perfect, complex model in an imperfect, complex world" (KII 6).

2. Adjusting donor and implementing agency expectations downwards

Fragile and conflict-affected contexts are considered "the hardest settings" in which to achieve results, and the most likely to produce failures and scandals

(OECD, 2018). According to an ODI Humanitarian Policy Group report, donor-funded projects are unlikely to end conflict or poverty or make people resilient to all the challenges they will face but this does not make them irrelevant (Levine and Mosel, 2014). Realism means having less ambitious objectives, being more modest about the ability of external actors to effect change and being more open about the likely degree of risk.

The BRACED programme saw that progress towards increased resilience was not linear in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, which in turn affected what implementing partners needed to do to achieve project goals (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 119). In other words, operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts requires a different programmatic approach, with implications for project delivery in operational terms.

The BRACED programme operated in many fragile and conflict-affected contexts and discovered the importance of a thorough initial and ongoing understanding of the operating context, paired with pragmatism and judgement regarding what can be achieved within the timeframe. This included what can be realistically monitored and measured given the possibly restricted access when conducting data collection due to security issues and potential sensitivities. During the programme, the level of ambition was pared down, for reasons related to the operating context and other internal and external factors. Within this revised level of ambition by the end of the third year, projects had spent 99.5% of allocated funds with a "high level of completion of activities benefiting vulnerable people".[91]

3. A more nuanced understanding of programme results is needed

A key broader lesson from BRACED was that there are different pathways towards building resilience, and that progress should be judged relative to the starting point (Silva Villanueva and Sword-Daniels, 2017: 8). Another lesson was that "simplistic assessments" of project success based only on performance ratings or results are not sufficient (Silva Villanueva, Sword-Daniels, Leavy and Wilson, 2018: 10).

The BRACED programme provided direct support to more than 3.4 million people, reaching 17% more beneficiaries than originally planned.[92] In addition, results in some projects were achieved in very challenging circumstances and so should be viewed through the lens of working in a context of fragility, conflict and insecurity. Progress in building resilience capacities to deal with climate extremes and disasters was seen across the board, but projects operating in more enabling contexts generally saw more results than those working in fragile and conflict-affected areas (Silva Villanueva, Phillips Itty and Sword-Daniels, 2018: 73). Where projects began from a lower starting point in terms of resilience, so "their achievements on paper may appear to be less impressive" than projects operating in relatively easier circumstances, so there is a need to ensure that such projects are not necessarily viewed as under-performing (Leavy et al., 2018: 101).

From the donor's perspective, there was no strong observed correlation between projects operating in more fragile and conflict-affected contexts and low levels of perceived success (KII 25). A DFID representative suggested this was due to the Fund Manager's performance tracking system being based on projects achieving what they said they would; if a project was realistic about what was possible at the outset, and met this ambition, they were seen as performing well. A pertinent question, however, is whether projects that significantly reduced their scope and restructured during the course of the programme would have been originally selected and funded if they had been realistic about what was achievable from the beginning.

4. Expectations of what climate resilience programmes can achieve

From a technical and programming perspective, the BRACED programme had too short an implementation period given its level of ambition in relation to sustainable resilience outcomes (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 46). In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, an absence of basic institutional and infrastructural systems reduced the ability of some projects to lay "building blocks" for change within the original three-year timeframe (Silva Villanueva, Phillips Itty and Sword-Daniels, 2018: 85). Where those "building blocks" were put in place, more time was still needed for resilience outcomes to be realised, although most projects did enhance resilience capacities in three years and across diverse contexts (Silva Villanueva, Phillips Itty and Sword-Daniels, 2018: 78).

Similarly, from an operational perspective, either the timeframe was too short or the ambition too high for what can be delivered in complex and fluid high-risk contexts.[93] Experience also shows the need to take into account the time and funding required to put well-functioning programmes in place; for example, the first year of the BRACED programme concentrated on establishing multi-partner project-level consortia and establishing ways of working within diverse operating contexts (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 47).

Other programmes also point to a need to have longer-term programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts than the typical 3–5 years, with a guiding vision rather than a prescribed path (OCED, 2016: 8). Moving to longer programme timeframes and more flexible

> In relation to funding climate resilience programmes, a member of the BRACED project team in South Sudan felt strongly that "just because people are in a war-torn country does not mean they are less affected by climate extremes. In fact, they are more affected, and self-reliance becomes much more critical because they are cut off from the outside world." They then suggested that "If the objective is to get definite wins, maybe put your money somewhere else. If your objective is to reach those people who need it the most, then for sure working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is a must" (BRACED IRISS Case Study).

programming will not happen overnight, although examples from other donors such as the German Government's Transitional Development Assistance, which funds cross-sectoral programmes to strengthen resilience, suggest that it is possible to "remain suitably flexible" and "lay the foundation" for longer-term programming (Levine and Mosel, 2014: 6–7).

Longer-term programming and extended timeframes for operational delivery will of course have cost implications, but the higher operating costs of operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – including those related to security – must be factored into project budgets from the start.

5. Donor and implementing partner roles in creating enabling environments

Donors can contribute to establishing a more enabling environment for resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts by adjusting their internal policies and ways of working, and by fully rolling these out. The 2018 OECD States of Fragility Report states however, that "There is surprisingly little variation in the spread of allocations between fragile and non-fragile contexts. This raises the question of how donors are differentiating their approaches to the unique needs of each fragile context, if they are not doing so through allocations" (OECD, 2018: 214). In addition, even when there are policy and spending commitments, there is still a substantial lag between institutional rhetoric and realities. Another OECD publication suggests that to achieve the flexible, adaptive, context-tailored, risk-sensitive programming required in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, political leadership and high-level institutional support are needed to overcome disincentives to do things differently, and to "manage external pressures to demonstrate results and avoid reputational risk" (OECD, 2016: 8).

Senior staff in implementing agencies have key roles in establishing and maintaining dialogue and advocacy with donors regarding the types of programmes and funding that are required in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Implementing agencies also have a role in ensuring programmes and projects are feasible, both at the proposal and early implementation stages.

By creating and focusing on more enabling environments, both donors and implementing partners are less likely to unconsciously lean towards certain contexts and types of activities over others, such as by focusing on easy-to-reach beneficiaries or contexts that have a higher starting point in terms of resilience, rather than those with lower levels of resilience in more challenging fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

The value of localisation and partnerships

Design and implementation of resilience-building programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts should not be done without the meaningful involvement of local partners. Experience from the BRACED programme clearly

shows that even before applying a fragile and conflict-affected contextual lens, effective partnerships must be seen as a critical component of climate resilience programmes, and that having "the right combination" of partners is essential for effective programming (Silva Villanueva, Gould and Pichon, 2016: 46).

BRACED case study projects for this review in Mali, Niger, Myanmar and South Sudan all showed that the involvement of local partners is even more critical in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In addition, it is important to have flexibility in partnerships, partly because of the uncertainty about how the context may evolve, how partners will respond to this, what programme actions could ultimately be most appropriate and how best to deliver these. For example, the BRACED IRISS project in South Sudan saw changes in its partnerships during the course of the project that were partly due to increased security risks.[94]

From the BRACED experience, it is clear that local partners have a deeper understanding that allows for more effective operational delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Local partners can also play a role in informing the original project design by confirming what is appropriate or not. Further, they can help identify and reach the most vulnerable and marginalised populations, as well as identify appropriate ways of working with local leaders. Local partners provide a direct link to the local context as it evolves, to support risk-informed, responsive and adaptive programming.

Working with local partners helps to support the implementation of conflict-sensitive and Do No Harm approaches. This review found that social inclusion and conflict sensitivity are not only important for resilience-building programming, but also for operational reasons linked to community acceptance and risk management. It is therefore important to ensure that climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts adopt conflict-sensitive approaches even when not explicitly working on conflict-related interventions. To ensure a Do No Harm and conflict-sensitive approach, project design must be reflective of the needs of the community, including the specific needs of vulnerable groups. Working with local partners can support this. The BRACED DCF project in Mali for example, worked directly with beneficiaries as "proactive stakeholders" from the design phase, making it "very different" from approaches taken by other implementing agencies in the context.[95] By not selecting the communities to benefit from the project or otherwise prioritising resilience investments, the DCF project was designed to ensure that decisions were taken by the communities themselves, based on their own priorities, and the final evaluation found that this was an important part of a conflict-sensitive approach.[96]

Having local partners in project implementing teams also enables a level of continuity in operations. Experience from BRACED projects found that local partners and staff were often able to have continued and more secure access to field sites for resilience building and monitoring and evaluation activities, when it would not have been safe for international staff to operate.[97] A member of the BRACED SUR1M team in Niger confirmed this, noting that local actors "will continue [programme] actions even in a crisis, since these local actors will not stop living [in the area] because of these crises".[98] The BRACED WYL project

in Mali found that having local partners improved the safety of both local and non-local staff, as well as other project participants.[99] It also helped ensure community participation in project activities, as trust was easier to build.[100] The BRACED SUR1M project also demonstrated a sound understanding of the context by hiring local field staff, renting vehicles locally, and consulting local leaders and community members.[101]

With a high reliance on local partners for operational delivery, upfront investment in their capabilities is key, including building their understanding and management of risk for the specific donor. The BRACED SUR1M project in Mali and Niger, for example, focused on building local partner capacity to ensure they were empowered to monitor progress, analyse the situation on the ground, and develop adaptive solutions.[102] Working with local partners brings many benefits, although the BRACED programme also learned the importance of having a "clear-eyed approach" to local agendas (KII 5).

The time taken to establish partnerships in fragile and conflict-affected contexts should not be underestimated. Working with diverse partners was a criterion for BRACED projects in the first place, making it a central feature of programme design. Some partnerships enabled joint implementation of project activities and a greater access to contextually tailored knowledge, but the effort required to build partnerships was generally greater than anticipated, resulting in some delays to implementation.

Engaging with government

Engaging with governments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts can be challenging, particularly if they are seen as party to some conflict situations, yet such a partnership is often crucial for effective resilience building and conflict prevention (Christian Aid, 2018: 6).

In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, extreme vulnerability is often caused by issues related to governance, including lack of political will, interest or incentives to reach marginalised groups. There is therefore potential tension in resilience programming between supporting the most vulnerable and working with governments whose policies may be partly responsible for low levels of resilience in the first place (Levine and Mosel, 2014).

According to a researcher from Tufts University, one way that resilience programmes differ is their longer-term perspective and their work with multiple layers of government, although governments within and outside fragile and conflict-affected contexts vary in their interest in and support of resilience programming.[103]

Conflict and insecurity can constrain the ability of projects to secure government buy-in and participation, which is a challenge for sustainability and project delivery in contexts where government permission is necessary for implementation. The BRACED SUR1M project in Mali and Niger found that conflict-sensitive approaches were important for securing community acceptance

of the project, including by government. Administrative and technical services at regional, departmental and communal levels in Niger were highly supportive of the project. The same level of support existed in Mali, though officials were not present in all communes due to issues of insecurity.[104] The BRACED DCF project in Mali facilitated a formal relationship between beneficiaries and local authorities, including mayors and communal councils, to design, select and prioritise resilience investments that improved the confidence of the local government and built trust between different stakeholder groups.[105] However, although it was believed to be highly successful, this type of contribution to social cohesion was not explicitly monitored by the BRACED programme.

BRACED projects found ways of engaging with government, as needed, but questions remained about what was appropriate in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. As seen in Theme 1 on Anticipating Operational Risks, working with governments can be a source of operational and reputational risk. The BRACED donor made specific requests for information to projects working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts regarding how they engaged with government at times when the reputational risk was deemed to be particularly high. On a day-to-day basis, the BRACED IRISS project in South Sudan found that focusing on grassroots was important, rather than structures and systems. The implementing team learned to "stay out of politics and stay out of the conflict [and to] focus on technical elements in the government – [getting] those government wins (that relationship) in that way" (KII 6). Based on experience of operational delivery, technical people tend not to be present in rebel-held areas, meaning a different approach is needed.

6. REFLECTIONS FOR FUTURE CLIMATE RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING

Image: United Nations Development Programme

Experiences from across the 15 projects that made up the BRACED portfolio, and the four projects explored in depth here, in Mali, Myanmar, Niger and South Sudan, are necessarily consolidated and simplified in this review. While each context is unique to itself, and lessons from one set of conditions cannot necessarily be readily applied to others, some level of extraction is necessary in order to make recommendations for future climate resilience programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. And, until the needed governance mechanisms are in place to allow for equitable distribution of climate finance through formal routes, channelling resources through and to non-government actors will be necessary to ensure that those at the sharp end of climate impacts, who are also contending with issues of fragility and conflict, are not left behind in the fight against climate change.

The recommendations below signal that significant change is required to effectively deliver climate resilience programmes in difficult operating environments, and to do so in ways that support conditions for peace, or at least as a minimum Do No Harm. How radical donors are willing to be to take heed of the lessons from BRACED will vary, depending on their aid portfolio and priorities, maturity of their systems, and importantly risk tolerance. For some, making conflict analysis a prerequisite for climate programming will be a major sea change. For others, there may be appetite to bring together climate, development, humanitarian and peace communities to better utilise

their respective approaches to different aspects of risk management; to enable more comprehensive teams from which programmes and funds can be designed which address the double vulnerability of climate and conflict risk. To support this endeavour, we present the following reflections.

Theme 1: Anticipating operational risks

- Donors need to confront the reality that, compared with similar climate programmes in more stable settings, in the majority of cases longer timeframes are required to deliver projects in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. To that end, implementing agencies should be encouraged to target fewer beneficiaries for more meaningful and sustainable change, focusing on quality rather than quantity. Donors also need to recognise the true cost of doing business in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, including the additional costs associated with insecurity, unpredictable economic and political conditions, weak institutional capacity and poor infrastructure – and allow these costs to be included in project budgets.

- Implementing agencies need to more thoroughly consider what types of climate resilience programming are viable and appropriate under different conditions of fragility and conflict. We are yet to see evidence of donors incentivising implementing partners to discuss this in any robust or meaningful way. It may be that agencies need to select operating areas that are relatively stable, as climate resilience programming may not be appropriate or even possible in more volatile areas, such as active conflict zones. Where that is the case, claims that projects are targeting the 'most vulnerable' may be obscuring the true picture of climate vulnerability.

- Programme and project design should be based on incremental layering and sequencing of activities and processes, and a realistic and honest appraisal of what is achievable within the specific context, technically, programmatically and operationally. Agencies may wish to mitigate the risks affecting overall project delivery by having multiple operating areas with differing risk profiles, taking into account potential disruptions including political change and displacement.

- Agencies should be acutely aware of, and push back against, any donor or stakeholder pressure to over-emphasise positive results and success stories and downplay less positive outcomes within specific operating environments. This should help manage expectations about what can be achieved within project bids.

- Finally, there needs to be a broader move towards understanding risks in a compound way, and considering how to better integrate context analyses and risk management approaches into design and implementation. It will also be important to regularly refresh this analysis. Risk-informed development offers a framework in this regard (Opitz-Stapleton, Nadin, Kellett, Calderone, Quevedo, Peters and Mayhew, 2019).

Theme 2: Absorbing impacts

- Implementing agencies should be required by donors to demonstrate that a process is in place to ensure that approaches are conflict sensitive, apply Do No Harm principles and take account of protection issues throughout the project cycle. Fully integrating a conflict-sensitive lens into climate resilience programmes will help avoid unintended consequences resulting from an intervention. Donors should consider allowing their implementing partners more time and funding to ensure that Do No Harm principles and conflict-sensitive methodologies are understood and applied at both headquarters and country levels, and hold them to account for this, including making 'conflict sensitivity' mandatory before implementing agencies receive funding. When designing programme budgets, agencies should ensure that resources are allocated for conflict expertise and analysis, and build conflict sensitivity into training and guidance.

- Greater attention is required to balance addressing immediate needs and long-term priorities, investing in efforts that support people, communities and institutions to build their resilience in the long term and create an enabling environment for peace. Links between climate change and conflict need to be better understood and considered in programme design, with immediate humanitarian work designed to transition towards resilience-building as soon as is feasible. As a starting point, analysis of the relationship between climate action plans, humanitarian priorities, economic development pathways and processes for peace could be undertaken to identify areas of commonality and difference. This could help lay the foundations for promoting, facilitating and supporting coordination across sectors, levels and programmes, creating links across climate change adaptation, humanitarian, development and peace-building activities to ensure that synergies are identified and duplication of effort is avoided.

- As a minimum, implementing agencies should consider building a project team that has (i) prior knowledge of the operating context in implementation areas; (ii) strong relationships and networks including key stakeholders; (iii) a combination of experienced local, national and international staff; (iv) the ability to deliver development and humanitarian programming; and (v) links with humanitarian infrastructure for ongoing context monitoring. While this may seem common sense, these basic foundational requirements are not always in place in climate resilience programming.

- Donors should consider adopting a portfolio approach within a specific geographic context, and articulating how investments in different sectors and interventions can work together to build resilience. This could include mapping contributions to different aspects of risk management from climate, development, humanitarian and peace actors. Such an endeavour would help move towards an integrated approach that includes peace-building, development, humanitarian and climate change adaptation, with 'building resilience' as an overarching objective.

Theme 3: Adapting to challenges

- Donors could involve implementing partners in the business case and design phase before calls for proposals are issued to improve understanding and anticipation of potential risks to operational delivery, and to lay the foundations for seeking alignment in risk appetites among donors and implementing partners at the start of a programme. Donors could establish funding proposals and selection processes that encourage honest accounting of specific contextual issues in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and how these may affect programming. This is not currently the norm. These processes should reward project designs that can be realistically delivered, with extra operating costs budgeted separately to be utilised and modified in response to changes in the context.

- Operational agencies should collectively demand flexibility from fund managers and promote an understanding that (i) programme and project activities may take longer to deliver; (ii) plans may need to change rapidly; and (iii) what is needed at implementation may be very different from what was included in the original proposal. A risk-informed approach to fund management is not yet the norm but is required, designed in partnership with implementing partners.

- Given that contexts change much more rapidly and often unpredictably in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, context analysis must be fully integrated in the project cycle, as a foundation for a flexible and adaptive approach to programming. Project plans should be aligned to the operating context so that projects can work within their specific contexts, rather than despite them, taking account of conditions of conflict and not seeking to ignore or work around them. Donors can help create an enabling environment for this. Information from context analyses together with real-time feedback should be tracked throughout implementation, and used to go beyond the mere listing of risks and assumptions in the project logframe and theory of change. Too often, despite being well aware of the challenges conflict and fragility present, project approaches are based on assumptions that relative peace and stability will prevail. Proactive and funded risk management plans are required to respond to the most likely scenarios.

- Donors should consider and build flexible funding mechanisms into climate resilience programmes from the outset in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, to support adjustments to activities during crises, and to protect resilience gains on the ground. More research is needed on the use of crisis modifiers for conflict-related shocks in fragile settings.

Implications for climate resilience programming

- Champions within donor organisations will be needed to advocate for more flexible and adaptive approaches, promoting closer working relationships between donors and implementing partners and more flexible funding mechanisms. Some decision-makers in donors such as DFID have promoted such ways of working, but more could be done to develop a culture of supportive leadership. Devolved decision-making to teams applying adaptive delivery, for example, means that individuals within donor organisations must be prepared to "swim against the tide of institutions, ideas and interests that shape the aid sector" (Christie and Green, 2018: 22).

- At programme design stage, donors should identify the types of outcomes being aimed for and why, as well as laying out a clear process for how to test, learn and adapt in order to best contribute to these outcomes. This should be accompanied by a clear process for managing risk, which will help to secure internal approval for programmes working with uncertainty. It may be necessary to consider flexible contracting arrangements that define the parameters and terms of relationships, rather than pre-specifying all programme deliverables. This is more feasible when there is a track record of past funding and an established and trusted relationship between donor and implementing partner.

- Implementing agencies need to be held to account for adapting their operations to the evolving fragile and/or conflict-affected context. Donors should not only enable flexibility and adaptability, but also demand it from implementing agencies. Implementing partners also need to update donors on how contexts are changing, and the adaptations needed as a result. Such insights may mean that flexible funding mechanisms are required, supported by robust contingency planning and risk management mechanisms to ensure that programmes are more resilient to shocks and stresses. Humanitarian advisors should help design these mechanisms to facilitate the allocation, implementation and monitoring of contingency funds within humanitarian timescales.

- Dedicated time should be devoted to understanding, managing and supporting project performance within specific contexts, giving fund managers sufficient autonomy, flexibility and resources to oversee projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Opportunities should be created to work closely with donors (including local offices) at key decision points to better understand what is what is feasible and appropriate within each context.

- Although time-consuming, implementing agencies should respond when donors request information and want to check that programmes are on track, not as a formality but by supporting them to understand the process nature of resilience-building, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This could help promote adaptive management, programming and delivery,

which require close engagement between donors, programme managers and implementers to ensure that there is a common understanding of the overall objectives and direction of a programme. This is likely to require more staff time and resources, which must be built into budgets and workplans.

- Risk management needs to be at the core of programming, ensuring that contingency plans are in place and that the resilience of the programme itself has been adequately considered. Contingency planning should not be limited to the design phase: plans should be revisited regularly, and implementing agencies need to make clear who is responsible for connecting contingency plans to action. To shift between routine plans and contingency planning, it will be necessary for agencies to establish partnerships that promote and enable nimble, reflexive and responsive working, maintaining a strong focus on *how* work is done, with responsive teams and partnerships that enable programming to absorb shocks and stresses. Learning from the crisis modifier mechanism can help in this regard.

It is hoped that these lessons from BRACED will prove useful in the future design and implementation of climate resilience programmes and projects, for the benefit of the far too many people affected by climate change and living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Bibliography

Bahadur, A. V., Peters, K., Wilkinson, E., Pichon, F., Gray, K. and Tanner, T. (2015) The 3As: Tracking resilience across BRACED. BRACED Report. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (www.odi.org/publications/9840–3as-tracking-resilience-across-braced)

Booth, D. and Unsworth, S. (2014) *Politically smart, locally led development.* ODI Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/8800-politically-smart-locally-led-development)

BRACED Knowledge Manager (March 2019) 'Marking the corridor of livestock in the Sahel, less conflicts between breeders and farmers in the target communes of BRACED'. Available at : www.braced.org/news/i/Marking-the-corridor-of-livestock-in-the-Sahel-less-conflicts-between-breeders-and-farmers-in-the-target-communes-of-BRACED/

BRACED Knowledge Manager (February 2019) 'Should aid work stop when militants move in?' Available at: www.braced.org/news/i/Should-aid-work-stop-when-militants-move-in/

BRACED Knowledge Manager (February 2018) 'Could tackling climate change help bring peace to South Sudan?' www.braced.org/news/i/Could-tackling-climate-change-help-bring-peace-in-South-Sudan/

BRACED Knowledge Manager (February 2018) 'Climate and conflict, bedfellows of disaster?' www.braced.org/news/i/Climate-and-conflict-bedfellows-of-disaster/

BRACED Knowledge Manager (June 2017) 'It's time to stop ignoring conflict in efforts to build resilience' www.braced.org/news/i/?id=52c35d8b-ce88–4a36-b8b5–4a8ddb7c769b

BRACED Knowledge Manager (January 2017) 'How to build resilience from the ground up'. Short video. www.braced.org/resources/i/?id=c2a78782–4575–4672-adf1–7a3fade73f48

Cabot Venton, C. and Sida, L. (2017) *The Value for Money of Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding: Emerging Findings*. Valid Evaluations Report. Oxford: Valid Evaluations (www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/the-value-for-money-of-multi-year-humanitarian-funding-emerging-findings)

Centre for Development Results (2018) *Working in Fragile States: Lessons for Policy and Practice*. Centre for Development Results Report. Reading: Centre for Development Results (www.centre4developmentresults.org/publications)

Christian Aid (2018) *Integrated Conflict Prevention and Resilience Field Guide*. START Network Report. London: Christian Aid (www.christianaid.ie/resources/about-us/integrated-conflict-prevention-and-resilience-handbook)

Christie, A. and Green, D. (2018) *Adaptive Programming in Fragile, Conflict and Violence-Affected Settings What works and under what conditions? The Case of Pyoe Pin*. Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Report. Brighton: IDS (www.ids.ac.uk/publications/adaptive-programming-in-fragile-conflict-and-violence-affected-settings-what-works-and-under-what-conditions-the-case-of-pyoe-pin-myanmar/)

Crawford, A., Dazé, A., Hammill, A., Parry, J. and Zamudio, A. N. (2015) *Promoting Climate-Resilient Peacebuilding in Fragile States*. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) Report. Winnipeg: IISD (www.iisd.org/library/promoting-climate-resilient-peacebuilding-fragile-states)

Department for International Development (DFID) (2019) Smart Rules: Better Programme Delivery. London: DFID. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-smart-rules-better-programme-delivery

Department for International Development (DFID) (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

DFID (2017) *BRACED Annual Review (1) 202921 (Published – December 2017).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

DFID (2017) *Addendum to the Business Case 202921 (Published – December 2017).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

DFID (2015) *BRACED Annual Review (4) 202921 (Published – August 2015).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

DFID (2014) *Business Case and Summary 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

Finaz, C. (2015) 'How to conceive resilience in a protracted crisis situation like eastern DRC?'. *International Alert*, 21 December 2015 (www.international-alert.org/blogs/how-conceive-resilience-protracted-crisis-situation-eastern-drc)

Grene, H. and Cammaer, R. (2017) *Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire Part 2: Building Resilience to Climate Change and Violent Conflict*. Christian Aid Report. London: Christian Aid (www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/campaigns/out-frying-pan-fire-part-two)

Haider, H. (2014) Conflict Sensitivity: Topic Guide. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham (https://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/conflict-sensitivity/concepts/the-evolution-of-conflict-sensitivity/)

Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) (2018) *Building resilience to natural disasters: A performance review*. ICAI Report. London: ICAI (https://icai.independent.gov.uk/report/resilience/)

Le Masson, V. (2018) *Challenging Assumptions: Should resilience-building projects (always) be socially acceptable?* BRACED Report. London: ODI (www.braced.org/resources/i/challenging-assumptions-socially-acceptable)

Le Masson, V., Benoudji, C., Sotelo Reyes, S. and Bernard, G. (2018) *Violence against Women and Girls and Resilience: Links, Impacts and Perspectives from the Chadian Context*. BRACED Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/11026-violence-against-women-and-girls-and-resilience)

Leavy, J., Boydell, E. and McDowell, S. (2017) *Making Progress: BRACED at the Mid-Term*. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/making-progress-braced-at-the-mid-term/)

Leavy, J., Boydell, E., McDowell, S. and Sladkova, B. (2018) *Resilience Results: BRACED Final Evaluation*. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/resilience-results-braced-final-evaluation)

Levine, S. and Mosel, I. (2014) *Supporting resilience in difficult places: A critical look at applying the 'resilience' concept in countries where crises are the norm.* Humanitarian Policy Group Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/8326-supporting-resilience-difficult-places)

Marin, A. and Otto Naess, L. (2017) "Climate Change Adaptation Through Humanitarian Aid? Promises, Perils and Potentials of the 'New Humanitarianism'", *IDS Bulletin* 48 (4): 15–30. Available at: https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/2884

Mobjörk, M., Gustafsson, M., Sonnsjö, H., Van Baalen, S., Dellmuth, L. M. and Bremberg, N. (2016) *Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach*. Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI) Report. Stockholm: SIPRI (www.sipri.org/publications/2016/climate-related-security-risks)

Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

O'Donnell, M. (2016) *Adaptive management: what it means for civil society organisations.* BOND Report. London: BOND (www.bond.org.uk/resources/adaptive-management-what-it-means-for-csos)

OECD (2016) "Good development support in fragile, at-risk and crisis affected contexts", *OECD Development Policy Papers*, No. 4. Paris: OECD Publishing (https://doi.org/10.1787/5jm0v3s71fs5-en)

OECD (2018), *States of Fragility 2018*. OECD Report. Paris: OECD Publishing (https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302075-en)

Opitz-Stapleton, S., Nadin, R., Kellett, J., Calderone, M., Quevedo, A., Peters, K. and Mayhew, L. (2019) *Risk-informed Development: From Crisis to Resilience*. ODI Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/11314-risk-informed-development-crisis-resilience)

Peters, K. and Peters, L.E.R. (2018) *Disaster Risk Reduction and Violent Conflict in Africa and Arab States: Implications for the Sendai Framework Priorities*. ODI Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/11208-disaster-risk-reduction-and-violent-conflict-africa-and-arab-states-implications-sendai-framework)

Peters, K. and Pichon, F. (2017) *Crisis Modifiers: A Solution for a More Flexible Development–Humanitarian System?* BRACED Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/10975-crisis-modifiers-solution-more-flexible-development-humanitarian-system)

Peters, K., Mayhew, L., Slim, H., Van Aalst, M. and Arrighi, J. (2019) *Double Vulnerability: The Humanitarian Implications of Intersecting Climate and Conflict Risk*. ODI Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/11295-working-paper-double-vulnerability-humanitarian-implications-intersecting-climate-and-conflict-risk)

Rohwerder, B. (2017) *Flexibility in funding mechanisms to respond to shocks*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1412. Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham (https://gsdrc.org/publications/flexibility-in-funding-mechanisms-to-respond-to-shocks/)

Silva Villanueva, P., Gould, C. and Pichon, F. (2016) Routes to Resilience: Insights from BRACED Year 1. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/routes-to-resilience-insights-y1/)

Silva Villanueva, P. and Sword-Daniels, V. (2017) Routes to Resilience: Insights from BRACED Year 2. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/routes-to-resilience-insights-y2)

Silva Villanueva, P., Phillips Itty, R. and Sword-Daniels, V. (2018) Routes to Resilience: Insights from BRACED Final Year. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/routes-to-resilience-insights-from-BRACED-final-year)

Silva Villanueva, P., Sword-Daniels, V., Leavy, J. and Wilson, D. (2018) Tracking and measuring resilience in large programmes: Lessons from BRACED. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/tracking-measuring-resilience-large-programmes/)

START Network (2017) *Case Study: Start Fund Alert 175 Anticipating High Stakes Elections in Kenya 2017*. START Network Report. London: START Network (https://startnetwork.org/resource/case-study-anticipating-high-stakes-elections-kenya-2017)

Teskey, G. (2017) *Thinking and Working Politically – are we seeing the emergence of a second orthodoxy?* Abt Associates White Paper. London: Abt Associates (www.abtassociates.com/insights/publications/white-paper/thinking-and-working-politically-are-we-seeing-the-emergence-of)

Ulrichs, M. (2016) *Increasing people's resilience through social protection*. BRACED Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/10420-increasing-people%E2%80%99s-resilience-through-social-protection)

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2017) *World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy*. UNCTAD Report. UNCTAD/WIR/2017 (https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1782)

UN Secretary-General (2009) *Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*. Report by the UN Secretary-General, A/64/350. New York: United Nations (https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/667264?ln=en)

Wild, L., Booth, D. and Valters, C. (2017) Putting theory into practice: How DFID is doing development differently. ODI Report. London: ODI (www.odi.org/publications/10729-putting-theory-practice-how-dfid-doing-development-differently)

Wilson, D., Yaron, G. and Béné, C. (2018) *Evaluating the results of BRACED projects in Ethiopia, Myanmar and Niger*. BRACED Report. Brighton: Itad (www.braced.org/resources/i/evaluating-results-of-braced-projects/)

Endnotes

1 Department for International Development (DFID) (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

2 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

3 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

4 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

5 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

6 BRACED Fund Manager, BRACED Annual Report, 2015, internal document, unpublished

7 BRACED DCF and SUR1M Case Studies in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

8 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

9 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

10 BRACED Myanmar Alliance Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

11 DFID (2014) *Business Case and Summary 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

12 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

13 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience

programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI; BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

14 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

15 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

16 DFID (2017) *BRACED Annual Review (1) 202921 (Published – December 2017).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

17 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

18 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

19 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

20 DFID (2015) *BRACED Annual Review (4) 202921 (Published – August 2015).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

21 DFID (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

22 BRACED IRISS and SUR1M Case Studies in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

23 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

24 DFID (2017) *Addendum to the Business Case 202921 (Published – December 2017).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

25 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

26 BRACED Fund Manager, BRACED Annual Report, 2015, internal document, unpublished

27 DFID (2014) *Business Case and Summary 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

28 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

29 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

30 DFID (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – December 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

31 DFID (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – December 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

32 DFID (2014) *BRACED Annual Review (3) 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents); DFID (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – December 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

33 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

34 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

35 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

36 BRACED Knowledge Manager (February 2018) 'Climate and conflict, bedfellows of disaster?' http://www.braced.org/news/i/Climate-and-conflict-bedfellows-of-disaster/

37 BRACED Knowledge Manager (June 2017) 'It's time to stop ignoring conflict in efforts to build resilience' http://www.braced.org/news/i/?id=52c35d8b-ce88–4a36-b8b5–4a8ddb7c769b

38 DFID (2014) *BRACED Annual Review (3) 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

39 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

40 DFID (2014) *BRACED Annual Review (3) 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

41 BRACED Myanmar Alliance Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

42 DFID (2014) *BRACED Annual Review (3) 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

43 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

44 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

45 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

46 BRACED Myanmar Alliance Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

47 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

48 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

49 DFID (2017) *BRACED Annual Review (1) 202921 (Published – December 2017).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

50 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

51 DFID (2014) *BRACED Annual Review (3) 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents

52 DFID (2014) *BRACED Annual Review (3) 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

53 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

54 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

55 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

56 Finaz, C. (2015) 'How to conceive resilience in a protracted crisis situation like eastern DRC?'. *International Alert*, 21 December 2015 (https://www.international-alert.org/blogs/how-conceive-resilience-protracted-crisis-situation-eastern-drc)

57 DFID (2014) *Business Case and Summary 202921 (Published – September 2014).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

58 BRACED Knowledge Manager (February 2018) 'Climate and conflict, bedfellows of disaster?' http://www.braced.org/news/i/Climate-and-conflict-bedfellows-of-disaster/

59 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

60 BRACED Knowledge Manager (March 2019) 'Marking the corridor of livestock in the Sahel, less conflicts between breeders and farmers in the target communes of BRACED'. Available at: http://www.braced.org/news/i/Marking-the-corridor-of-livestock-in-the-Sahel-less-conflicts-between-breeders-and-farmers-in-the-target-communes-of-BRACED/

61 See: Itad 'Does adaptive programming work in fragile contexts, and why? The case of PERL in Nigeria', available at: https://www.itad.com/does-adaptive-programming-work-in-fragile-contexts-and-why-the-case-of-perl-in-nigeria/

62 DFID (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – December 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

63 DFID (2017) *BRACED Annual Review (1) 202921 (Published – December 2017).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents); and DFID (2018) *BRACED Annual Review (2) 202921 (Published – December 2018).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

64 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

65 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

66 BRACED Myanmar Alliance Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

67 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

68 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

69 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

70 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

71 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

72 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

73 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

74 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished

75 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2016–17, internal document, unpublished; and BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

76 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents); and DFID (2015) *BRACED Annual Review (4) 202921 (Published – August 2015).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

77 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

78 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

79 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

80 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2015, internal document, unpublished

81 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2015, internal document, unpublished

82 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

83 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

84 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2015, internal document, unpublished

85 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

86 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report, 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

87 BRACED Fund Manager Annual Report 2017/18, internal document, unpublished

88 BRACED WYL quarterly reports (2014–2018) internal documents, unpublished

89 BRACED Knowledge Manager (February 2019) 'Should aid work stop when militants move in?' Available at: http://www.braced.org/news/i/Should-aid-work-stop-when-militants-move-in/

90 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

91 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

92 BRACED Fund Manager, Annual Report 2017–18, internal document, unpublished

93 DFID (2016) *BRACED Annual Review (5) 202921 (Published – September 2016).* UK DFID Report. London: DFID (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1–202921/documents)

94 BRACED IRISS Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

95 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

96 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

97 BRACED DCF, SUR1M and IRISS Case Studies in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

98 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

99 BRACED WYL quarterly reports (2014–2018) internal documents, unpublished

100 BRACED WYL quarterly reports (2014–2018) internal documents, unpublished

101 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

102 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

103 BRACED Knowledge Manager (January 2017) 'How to build resilience from the ground up'. Short video. http://www.braced.org/resources/i/?id=c2a78782–4575–4672-adf1–7a3fade73f48

104 BRACED SUR1M Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

105 BRACED DCF Case Study in Neaverson, A., Gould, C., Teakle, A., Andrews, S., Singh, S., Singh, S., Na Abou, M and Peters, K. (2019) Delivering climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected areas: a synopsis of learning on the ground. BRACED Report. London: ODI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank all those who shared ideas, experience and evidence on the delivery of climate resilience programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and especially the very many people involved in the 15 BRACED projects, as well as the Fund Manager and Knowledge Manager for the BRACED programme.

In particular, we gratefully acknowledge the following colleagues who contributed to the review.

From the BRACED *Decentralising Climate Funds* (DCF) project, we would like to thank Aly Boucoum, Yamadou Diallo, Daouda Cissé, Lassana Kamian and Jennifer Abdella. From the BRACED *Improving Resilience in South Sudan* (IRISS) project, we would like to thank Nellie Kingston, Alan Brouder, Mike Mangano and Martin Oloka. From the BRACED *Scaling-up Resilience to Climate Extremes for 1 Million* (SUR1M) project, we would like to thank Jeanne Ella Andrianambinina, Diallo Mamadou, Ibrahim Bakoye, Nassirou Adamou and Chelsea Treadwell. From the BRACED *Myanmar Alliance* project, we would like to thank Jeremy Stone, Kelly Stevenson, Chloe Dessemond and Moira Simpson. From the BRACED *Wati Yelema Labenw* (WYL) project, we would like to thank David Benafel, Fatoumata Gareka and Sanoussi Fane. From the BRACED Knowledge Manager, we would like to thank Yaya Bouré, Moussa Na Abou, Charlotte Rye, Zoë Windle, Leigh Mayhew, Maarten van Aalst, Rebecca Nadin, Lindsey Jones, Arnaldo Pellini, Lucy Faulkner and Dave Wilson. From the BRACED Fund Manager, we would like to thank John Choptiany, Jennifer M'Vouama, Renée Chartres and Sarah Clarke. From the UK Department for International Development (DFID), we would like to thank Jenna Saidi, Malcolm Ridout, Tim Waites and Juliet Field. We would also like to thank everyone who participated in the session on this topic held at the 2019 BRACED Annual Learning Event in Nairobi.

From outside the BRACED programme, we would like to thank those who gave their time to support this report, including David Howlett from the Global Resilience Partnership, Simone di Vincenz from Christian Aid, Moustapha Ibrahim from Plan International, Sanoussi Ababale from CARE International, Mahamane Yacouba from the Danish Refugee Council, Youssouf Amadou Tidjani from the Niger Ministry of Humanitarian Action, Moussa Wakasso from the Strategy For Development And Security in Niger, Abdoul Razak Hama Abdourahamane from the Centre National d'Etudes Stratégiques et de Sécurité in Niger and Issalak Alhamodu, Mayor of Inates in Niger.

To the post-graduate students from the London School of Economics, who supported on the case study development, we extend heartfelt thanks: Ashley Teakle, Sophie Andrews, Sakshee Singh and Saisha Singh.

We would also like to thank our peer reviewers, John Choptiany and Lewis Sida, for their time and constructive feedback.

Thanks also to Holly Combe and Green Ink for the substantive editing of this report.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without generous financial support from DFID, which is very gratefully acknowledged.

The BRACED Knowledge Manager generates evidence and learning on resilience and adaptation in partnership with the BRACED projects and the wider resilience community. It gathers robust evidence of what works to strengthen resilience to climate extremes and disasters, and initiates and supports processes to ensure that evidence is put into use in policy and programmes. The Knowledge Manager also fosters partnerships to amplify the impact of new evidence and learning, in order to significantly improve levels of resilience in poor and vulnerable countries and communities around the world.

Published September 2019

Website: www.braced.org
Twitter: @braced
Facebook: www.facebook.com/bracedforclimatechange

Cover image: Women leaving a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to collect firewood. Gereida, South Darfur, Sudan © Sven Torfinn

Designed and typeset by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk

UKaid
from the British people

DEVELOPMENT WORKS
A Plan International UK company